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This dissertation is composed of three essays focus on intergroup marriage and 
female-headed households. I am motivated by recognizing systemic or structural 
factors affecting marriage outcomes in China and Chinese Americans in the United 
States.  
 The first essay, “Who Gains and Who Loses from Interethnic Marriage? -- 
Evidence from Western China”, estimates economic returns from interethnic 
marriages in China. Until now, interethnic marriage has not been tested as a 
possibility for overcoming the Han (the majority ethnic group)-ethnic Minzu (the 
minority ethnic groups) earnings disparity. To test the causal relationship between the 
Han- ethnic Minzu intermarriage and earnings, I adopt the instrumental variable 
approach and use the equal-protection clause of interethnic marriage and supportive 
attitudes towards interethnic marriage as the instruments to identify the causal effect 
between intermarriage and earnings. The estimates indicate that ethnic Minzu do not 
gain statistically significant benefits by marrying Han. Furthermore, the returns for 
Han and ethnic Minzu members from intermarriage are different once controlling the 
unobserved correlation between Han- ethnic Minzu intermarriage and earnings.  
 The second essay, “Linking the Supply of Marriageable Males and 
Female-Headed Families: the case of China”, measures the linkage between supply 
of marriageable males to the formation of female headship. Owing to the combination 
of the One Child Policy and the cultural son preference, China has a persistent male 
surplus problem. A key insight from the literature posits that the supply of males in 
the marriage market affects changes in family structure. Focusing on economic 
desirability of unmarried men, rather than just quantity of men, my measure presents 
a sizeable and negative relationship between male marriageability and female 
headship for ethnic Minzu, but an insignificant, minimal relation for Han. The 
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demonstrated ethnic differences relate to potential employment inequality faced by 
Minorities/Minzu men and the disparate marriage market for ethnic Minzu women in 
China. 
The third essay, “Anti-Miscegenation Laws, Chinese Exclusion Acts and 
Interracial Marriages of Chinese Americans between 1880 and 1940”, examines 
impacts from U.S. anti-miscegenation laws on interracial marriages for Chinese 
Americans. U.S. Anti-Miscegenation Laws existed at the state level and were made 
unconstitutional nationwide by Loving v. Virginia in 1967. However, not every state 
had an Anti-Miscegenation Law, and not every state excluded Chinese from marrying 
whites. Using the U.S. Decennial Census data from 1880 to 1940 and employing the 
difference-in-difference estimator, my results show no statistically significant impact 
from Chinese anti-miscegenation laws on both Chinese males’ and females’ 
interracial marriages. This finding is robust to an event history analysis and a 
synthetic cohort method. The historical ban on Chinese interracial marriages 
establishes the backdrop of high incidence of Chinese interracial marriages in the 21st 
century.  
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Marriage, one of the most intimate personal relationships, provides 
information on individual preferences and reflects laws and societal inequalities. By 
answering who marries whom or who is not in the marriage market, we understand 
more about family and social group formation. Two deviations from the traditional 
family formation tendencies are intergroup marriage and female-headed households. 
Studying these deviations helps us understand social boundaries and stratification 
systems. In addition, the government regulation of marriage plays a vital role in 
shaping marriage outcomes. However, much of the applied policy analysis literature 
on marriage outcomes focuses mainly on individual choices and consequences and 
ignores systemic or structural factors that can affect inequality between groups.  
I am motivated by recognizing systemic or structural factors affecting 
marriage outcomes in China and Chinese Americans in the United States. My 
dissertation explores how public policies and laws affect deviations from family 
formation traditions and norms regarding intergroup marriages and female-headed 
households, resulting in inequalities. Specifically, I study the following three types of 
structural factors: 
1) inter-ethnic marriage policies in China that are designed to create greater 
unity within the Chinese economy. 
 2 
 2) the remnants of the one-child policy and exemptions afforded to ethnic 
minorities and their impacts on female-headed families.  
3) U.S. anti-miscegenation laws designed to preclude the marriage of Chinese 
with whites.  
I am drawing theories from sociology, demography, and economics while 
relying on the substance drawn from historical accounts. The dissertation uses 
analysis grounded in modern policy analysis methods. I am trying to isolate the causal 
relationships and understand the mechanisms behind the laws and public policies that 
seemingly affect family formation. Specifically, I am asking the following three 
questions:  
1) Who gains and who loses from inter-ethnic marriages in China as measured 
by post-marriage incomes. 
2) What is the linkage between male quality and the formation of female-
headed households in China? And what are the ethnic differences in this linkage 
between male quality and the formation of female-headed households? 
3) What is the impact of the enactment of the Chinese Anti-Miscegenation 
Laws in the U.S on the Chinese Americans’ interracial marriages? 
While the literature on intergroup marriage is mainly US-centric, China, a 
multi-ethnic country, is experiencing a dramatic increase in interethnic marriages. 
Suggestive evidence shows ethnic minority females marry Han (major group males) 
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to increase their incomes. This phenomenon of “marrying up” in China has never 
formally been tested.  Unbalanced sex ratios may leave some individuals unmarried 
and lead to counter-intuitive changes in family structures in China and the rise in 
female-headed households. 
One stream of wisdom from the literature on marriage in the United States 
reveals that the surplus of males allows females to be more selective about their 
husband's qualities as measured by education level or economic status. Notably, 
differences in the formation of female-headed households between ethnic majority 
and minority group members in China are severely understudied.   
To date, most of the studies on the effects of U.S. Anti-Miscegenation laws 
focus on black-white intergroup marriage. Little quantitative research has directly 
examined the historical impacts of U.S. Anti-Miscegenation for other minorities, such 
as the Chinese. Meanwhile, the study of the enactment of Anti-Miscegenation laws on 
Chinese Americans' intergroup marriages is complicated by the history of Chinese 
discrimination. The Page Act of 1875 started a series of Chinese exclusion acts to 
discriminate against all Chinese immigrants. The pervasive view of the Chinese as 
"unassimilable" approved racial discrimination against the Chinese and added adverse 
layers to the Chinese experience in the U.S. Moreover, unlike literature on black-
white marriages, illustrating that they remained low after the repeal of anti-
miscegenation laws, Chinese interracial marriages increased at high incidence once 
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legitimized in the late 20th and 21st century. Thus, studying the historical laws shows 
how the increase of Asian-white interracial marriages emerged against a backdrop of 
prohibition of such marriages in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.  
Thus, there are still significant gaps in our understanding of interracial and 
interethnic marriage and family structure for some ethnic minority groups. Addressing 
these gaps is essential because racial and ethnic inequality is inscribed in traditional 
family structures and marriage norms. The results from my analysis advance our 
understanding of how Chinese families are helped or hindered by laws and policies 
that create or perpetuate ethnic and gender imbalances in the marriage market.  
My dissertation contributes to the literature in three substantive ways: 
1) The dissertation provides the first estimates of the economic returns to 
interethnic marriage in China. The instrumental variable estimates indicate that ethnic 
minorities do not gain statistically significant benefits from marrying Han. The 
returns for Han and ethnic minority members from intergroup marriage are different 
once one controls for the unobserved correlation between Han-minority intergroup 
marriage and earnings. The dissertation differentiates between the effects of ethnic 
minority women marrying Han men and Han women marrying ethnic minority men.  
 2) The dissertation produces a novel and adaptive measure of economic 
attractiveness of males for marriages in China. The results show that there are 
differing links between marriageable males and the prevalence of female-headed 
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households between majority Han and minority ethnic groups. There are disparate 
effects of male supply on family formation in China between ethnic minorities and 
Han people. 
3) The dissertation produces quantitative estimates of interracial marriages 
among Chinese Americans in the era of the Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws and 
the Chinese Exclusion Acts. The causal study of historical laws indicates the 
importance of how properly studying historical policy can aid in the understanding of 
current trends. 
 Together, these essays provide new insights into the effects of legal and policy 
interventions affecting marriage and families in China and historically among Chinese 
in America.  The recent upsurge in anti-Asian crimes and the assaults and murders of 
Asian American women coincide in complex ways with the murder of George Floyd 
and the escalation of police use of force against African Americans. The xenophobia 
and racism, must be understood in a historical context and often can be illuminated by 
examination of specific laws and regulations relating to intergroup interactions.  
Clearly, the most intimate of intergroup interactions is marriage, making the 
exploration in this dissertation particularly compelling and policy relevant.  The 
timely study of historical legislation, developing an adaptive measure for mate 
searching, and estimating the returns from inter-ethnic marriages, deepen our 
understanding of current circumstances for ethnic minorities in the marriage market. 
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The knowledge gained from my research helps us understand the family structure as a 





Essay One: Who Gains and Who Loses from Interethnic Marriage?  





1.1 Introduction  
Considerable evidence documents that ethnic minorities (Shao Shu Minzu or Minzu, 
少数民族 (Shi, 1999)) and rural residents in China face persistent labor market 
inequality (Hannum and Xie, 1998; Sicular et al., 2007; Wu and Song, 2014). They 
have higher poverty rates (Gustafsson and Zhong, 2000; Bhalla and Qiu, 2006; 
Gustafsson and Ding, 2009; Myers et al.,2013, Gradin, 2015), lower labor force 
participation rates (Maurer-Fazio, Hughes and Zhang, 2010), lower wage and salary 
earnings (Zhang and Li, 2001; Ding, Li and Myers, 2013; Wu and He, 2016), and 
lower incomes in general (Shi and Sai, 2013).  
Various studies offer explanations for why Han Chinese are advantaged over 
ethnic minorities in the Chinese labor market (Sicular et al., 2007; Li and Ding, 2013; 
Campos et al. 2016, Tang et al., 2016; Hannum and Cheng, 2020). Among all of the 
theories, ideas from social capital, or more specific to the Chinese case – Guanxi (关
系),Chinese expression of personalized social relations, connects individual 
endowment to social resources. Guanxi embeds in and relies on social networks of 
reciprocity and exchange (Bian, 1997). Research by Hasmath (2011) and Hasmath 
and Ho (2015) shows that Han majority members have significantly larger Guanxi 
networks than ethnic minorities, thereby increasing their social resources and access 
to jobs. For ethnic minorities, their higher prevalence of rural residence and their 
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lower levels of Guanxi combine to exacerbate their labor market disadvantage 
(Gustafsson and Ding, 2009; Zang, 2013).  
However, one unsettled argument of whether or how Guanxi accelerates the labor 
market advantage is from the intermarriage perspective. On one hand, intermarriage 
may bring new, useful Guanxi ties, which may alleviate ethnic minorities 
disadvantaged economic situation (Liu and Zhang, 2015). On the other hand, some 
minority women and children in Xinjiang who intermarried with Han (Li, 2004) were 
concerned about judgment from friends and employees over their ethnic rituals and 
traditions since they had to convert their ethnic identity to Han. Furthermore, ethnic 
minorities who marry Han majority members may be advantaged in other ways (i.e., 
with higher levels of education, see Hannaum et al., 2010). Until now, interethnic 
marriage has not been tested as a possibility for overcoming the Han-minority 
earnings disparity.  
Therefore, in this paper, I estimate the returns to intermarriage between majority 
Han and Minzu. By answering who gains and who loses from interethnic marriages, I 
test whether Han-Minzu marriage can alleviate inequalities faced by Minzu in the 
labor market. To identify the causal relationship between Han-Minzu marriage and 
earnings, I use an instrumental variable approach. My instruments for Han-Minzu 
marriage are an equal-protection clause of Han-Minzu marriage and supportive 
attitudes towards Han-Minzu marriage. I find Han-Minzu marriage does not 
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statistically impact earnings. Rather, the economic returns for Han-Minzu 
intermarriage vary across gender and ethnic Minzu status. Since there are few 
empirical studies focus on Han-Minzu intermarriage and earnings, my findings add to 
our understanding of how different types of marriage affect earnings in Western 
China. More broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on persistent ethnic 
inequality and labor market outcome.  
In what follows, I first summarize the theoretical framework of intermarriage. 
Then, I describe intermarriage between Han and Minzu in Western China. Next, I 
develop the case for two instrumental variables that help to obtain a local average 
treatment effect of intermarriage on income and test whether and to what degree Han-
Minzu intermarriage improves economic outcomes for Minzu. Finally, I provide a 
discussion of the economic returns to Han- Minzu intermarriage and the policy 
implications for the marriage market in China. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework of Intermarriage 
Well-established evidence shows that people tend to marry within their social groups 
(Kalmijn,1998). This phenomenon is variously known as marital homogamy, 
endogamy, intramarriage or positive assortative mating1. The classic factors on which 
 
1 To be consistent, in the rest of this paper “intramarriage” will be used to denote homogamy, 
endogamy and positive assortative mating.   
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people typically match in the marriage market are education (Mare 1991), 
race/ethnicity (Kalmijn 1993; Banerjee et al., 2013), and religion (Bisin and Verdier, 
2000; Bisin et al., 2004).  
 Regarding intermarriage,2 defined as marrying outside one’s race, ethnicity, or 
nationality group, theories suggest several possible determinants. First, demographic 
structures of the marriage market such as a lack of available partners in one’s group 
may lead to intermarriage (Blau and Fitzpatrick,1984; Tucker and Mitchell-
Kernan,1990; Qian and Litcher,2011; Abramitzky et. al, 2011). Second, higher 
educational attainment increases the probability of marrying outside one’s ethnic 
group. Studies show that compared to people with low educational attainment, people 
with high attainment have a higher likelihood of marrying partners of different races 
or religions (Qian, 1997; Kalmijn,1993 and 1998; Gullickson, 2006; Fu, 2008).  
Finally, exchange theory (Homans, 1958 and Blau, 1964) and/or utility-
maximizing theory (Becker, 1973; Kalmijn, 1993) predict the exchange of one status 
characteristic for another. For example, one derivative of exchange theory--status-
caste exchange--suggests that an ethnic minority member may exchange their higher 
socio-economic status for their lower position in the ethnic hierarchy by marrying a 
majority ethnic group member (Han) who has lower relative socio-economic status 
 
2 In the literature, scholars also use exogamy, hypergamy, heterogamy or negative assortative mating 
when referring to marriage outside one’s group. This paper will use “intermarriage” for consistency.  
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(Merton, 1941; Schoen and Wooldredge, 1989; Qian, 1997). However, some 
theoretical and empirical studies find only weak support for the status-caste exchange 
theory (Bernard, 1966, Porterfield 1978; Hou and Myles, 2013). Instead, recent 
studies argue that education trumps other status characteristics, such that interethnic 
or inter-religious marriages are motivated more by similarities in educational 
attainment than by exchanging differences in status characteristics (Rosenfeld, 2007; 
Schwartz et al., 2016; Torche and Rich, 2017).  
The case of China demonstrates three possible intermarriage scenarios. First, the 
demographic structure of China is one factor that plausibly influences intermarriage. 
As many scholars have noted, sex ratios in China are imbalanced – there are 
significantly more men than women. Intermarriage rates will be higher if the sex ratio 
is more imbalanced for one specific demographic group. In that case, some members 
in that group have to marry outside of their group in order to achieve equilibrium in 
the marriage market (Abramitzky et al., 2011; Bloch and Ryder, 2000). The empirical 
evidence from 1982, 1990 and 2000 China census data analyzed by Jia and Persson 
(2021) finds that when the Han male-to-female sex ratio goes up by one standard 
deviation, the probability of intermarriage between a Han man and an ethnic minority 
woman goes up by 3.4 percentage points. The same pattern holds among ethnic 
minorities as well: when the Minzu male to female sex ratio goes up, the probability 
of intermarriage between a Minzu men and a Han woman increases. 
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Second, the role of human capital accumulation in intermarriage also plays out in 
China. Recall that this perspective suggests that intermarriage rates will be higher for 
highly educated groups (Liu and Zhang, 2015). This is because college increases 
opportunities to associate with youth from other ethnic groups (Jian, 2017). Further, 
the location of universities in large Chinese cities increases the probability of meeting 
people dissimilar from oneself and decreases parental influence on children who 
move away from home for college (Mare,1991; Rosenfeld, 2007; Jian, 2017). In 
addition, the influence of education on intermarriage may work through language 
proficiency. Jian (2017) finds a relatively high rate of intermarriage between Han 
majority group members and ethnic Mongolians who speak Mandarin, suggesting that 
language is a conduit for interaction between groups. Of course, higher levels of 
education are associated with greater Mandarin language proficiency. However, in a 
phenomenon that may be unique to China, ethnic minorities who hold at least a 
bachelor’s degree learn ethnic theory in university, which enhances their own ethnic 
consciousness and may further strengthen their orientation toward fellow members of 
their ethnic group as marriage partners (Jian, 2017). In this perspective, a higher level 
of educational attainment may decrease interethnic marriage. 
Finally, from an exchange theory perspective, an incentive of exchanging 
resources between couples also increases intermarriage rates (Becker,1973). Spouses 
can compensate for their disadvantages by exchanging resources, such as Hukou, a 
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Chinese household registration system (Tian et al., 2018; Wang and Schwartz, 2018), 
age (Mu and Xie, 2014), family background (Lui, 2016), and/or skills (Yu and Xie, 
2015) to maximize personal and household utility. For example, using the China 2005 
1% Inter-Census data, Mu and Xie (2014) discovered that status exchange dominates 
the age intermarriage pattern after the 1990s. Intensified labor market pressures 
explain marriages of older men to younger women on the basis of exchange theory – 
that is, he exchanges his higher career status for her relative youth (a desirable trait in 
wives).  
Lastly, and unique to the case of China, the one-child policy, in effect from 1978 
to 2015, induced higher interethnic marriage rates because of its exemption for 
interethnic couples – that is, ethnic minorities did not need to abide by the one-child 
policy (Huang and Zhou, 2015)3. With the exemption, a couple with at least one 
ethnic minority member could legally have a second child (Gu et al., 2007). If a Han 
majority member desired a family with two children, they had a strong incentive to 
marry an ethnic minority member.  
In summary, interethnic marriage in China demonstrates both the patterns 
suggested by the existing literature and the special circumstances driven by ethnic 
education and the one-child policy. Patterns consistent with demographic forces, 
educational attainment, and exchange theory prevail in the Chinese case. 
 
3 Zhuang and Manchu are excluded in some provinces.  
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1.3 Legal Protection of Han-Ethnic Minzu Intermarriage  
Preservation of ethnic group identity is the main reason for social and legal 
sanctions against intermarriage (Li,2006; Ma, 2001). Social taboos and the legal 
status of Han-Minzu intermarriages were of concern to Chinese governments since 
the 1950s (Zhang, 1987). The 1950 marriage law legalized marriage freedom and 
intermarriage for men and women. Every edition of the marriage law of the People's 
Republic of China since 1950 (1950, 1980, 2001 and 2020) includes articles similar to 
these4:  
Article 2: A marriage system based on the free choice of partners, on monogamy 
and on equality between man and woman shall be applied. 
 Article 5: Marriage must by based upon the complete willingness of both man 
and woman. Neither party may use compulsion on the other party and no third 
party may interfere. 
One interpretation of the above articles is equal protection of intermarriage 
between Han and ethnic minority people. Nonetheless, the last article in all versions 
of the marriage law emphasizes that: 
 
4 Appendix Table 1.1 lists all articles relevant to intermarriage from different versions of the national 
marriage law. 
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“… The people's congresses in national autonomous areas shall have the right to 
formulate certain adaptations in light of specific conditions of the local nationalities in 
regard to marriage and family. …” 
These special articles acknowledge 1) marriage and family formation are different in 
ethnic minority areas compared with the rest of the country, and 2) intermarriages are 
different from intramarriage in ethnic minority areas. 
 Meanwhile, in 'Reply of the Ministry of the Interior on the issue of interethnic 
marriage’, state council stressed that “… [to] respect the ethnic cultural and religious 
customs, and for the unity of Han and ethnic minorities, persuade a man and women 
not to marry if the ethnic tradition does not allow intermarriage". Consequently, 
interethnic marriage was legal but not encouraged from the 1950s to the 1980s.   
 With the revision and implementation of the 1980 marriage law, autonomous 
local governments started to formulate and implement local intermarriage adaptations 
to the national marriage law. Appendix Table 2 lists all the provincial-and county-
level adaptations of the national marriage law in ethnic minority residential areas 
from the Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory Database. All the local adaptations 
approved a lower legal minimum age for marriage, which is two years younger than 
the national requirement (men: 22 years old, women: 20 years old) for both men and 
women. However, not every adaptation underlines equal protection of interethnic 
marriage. Sometimes, respect for ethnic marriage traditions conflicts with equal 
 17 
protection of interethnic marriage. In reality, interethnic marriage is not entirely 
recognized by ethnic customs and cultures. As Li (2006) suggests in a study of 
marriage policies in Xinjing, civilian authorities do not promote but do protect 
interethnic marriage among Uyghurs and Kazakhs. Civilian authorities help young 
couples persuade their parents to agree to their intermarriage. In sum, despite being 
legal since the 1950s, the taboo of interethnic marriage has not completely 
disappeared from ethnic minority autonomous areas.   
 
1.4 Data and Method 
1.4.1 Ethnic Minzu and Chinese Household Ethnicity Survey (2011)  
Members of 55 different Minzu groups compose about nine percent of the Chinese 
population according to the 2010 China census and the 2015 one percent population 
survey. Nearly 80 percent of all Minzu are from ten groups. Table 1.1 presents the ten 
largest Minzu groups in China, consistent across both the 2010 census and the 2015 
one percent population survey. The bolded residential provinces are home to the five 
designated Minzu autonomous regions – most of which are rural and in the Western 
regions of China. However, some Minzu groups like Hui and Miao are spread across 
the country. Because of the relatively small Minzu population size and their 
concentrated residential patterns, it is difficult for nationally representative surveys to 
generate a sample of Minzu large enough to study intermarriage in China. This study 
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employs the China Household Ethnicity Survey 2011 (CHES 2011), a survey that 
purposely oversamples Minzu and rural areas (Gustafsson, Hasmath, and Ding, 2020). 
CHES 2011 was initially designed to collect both rural and urban households from 
eight western provinces or Autonomous Regions, the traditional minority areas. 
However, due to political reasons and data quality issues, Tibet Autonomous Region 
and Yunnan Province were not included. To minimize the loss of two minority areas, 
CHES sampled Hunan province and autonomous prefecture in Qinghai. In total, they 
are the seven CHES provinces.  
[Insert Table 1.1 here] 
In figure 1.1, colored provinces are the provinces included in the CHES. The 
provinces in blue indicate Minzu autonomous regions. The names of Minzu 
autonomous regions are based on the Minzu group with the largest share of the 
population in that province. For example, Nei Mongol derives its name from the 
disproportionate share of ethnic Mongolians. In general, Minzu autonomous regions 
have more legislative rights than a regular province. 
[Insert Figure 1.1 here] 
The China Household Ethnicity Survey 2011 interviewed approximately 6,000 
people in seven of the top ten Minzu concentrated provinces, generating a total study 
sample of 41,733. The average Minzu share in the CHES sample is 59 percent, and all 
55 Minzu groups are represented in the sample. As table 1.2 suggests, the average 
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Minzu share in the sampled seven provinces and autonomous regions is 26 percent of 
the total population according to the 2010 Census, which is almost three times the 
nationwide Minzu population share. Table 1.2 also indicates that CHES sampling is 
undertaken in such a way that numbers of observations from selected provinces are 
not proportional to the size of the province. To the extent that the ethnic composition 
of the CHES provinces differs from the rest of the country, it is possible that the 
advantaged minorities in the CHES survey overshadow the less advantaged minorities 
elsewhere when looking at data in the aggregate. Therefore, I weight the urban and 
rural subsamples and Han and Ethnic Minzu so that their population shares are equal 
to those in the total population according to Census-based population.   
[Insert Table 1.2 here] 
1.4.2 Measures 
My dependent variable is annual earnings, which includes wages and salary, operating 
income, and property income such as rental income. Income is measured in 2011 
Chinese yuan (RMB) and is captured in a continuous format with a range of 1,770 to 
816,000 RMB. My primary independent variable of interest is Han-Minzu 
intermarriage. The survey asks respondents their own and their spouse’s ethnicity. A 
dummy variable coded ‘1’ indicates a case of Han-Minzu intermarriage, and ‘0’ 
indicates a Han-Han marriage. 
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I combine the 55 Minzu groups together to create a representative and larger 
sample for Minzu groups. I recognize that there is heterogeneity between ethnic 
groups on many dimensions, but all ethnic groups are economically disadvantaged 
relative to the Han majority in China. For the purposes of understanding economic 
position and changes therein, combining Minzu groups in this way should not 
undermine my findings, but I acknowledge that it may obscure some nuance.  
Other independent variables include rural to urban migrant worker status which 
equals ‘1’ if the respondent migrated from a rural area to a city for work lasting at 
least three months. The indicator for rural residency equals ‘1’ if the respondent lived 
in a rural area during 2011. The respondents’ level of education is measured by the 
highest level of academic attainment coded into six categories: 1) no schooling, 2) 
less than high school, 3) high school completion, 4) secondary vocational high school 
or technical high school, 5) some college but not a four-year degree, and 6) a college 
or higher degree. Each of the above attainment levels has its own corresponding 
binary indicator. As suggested by the literature, a binary variable of Chinese 
Community Party membership measures political capital with ‘1’ reflecting CCP 
membership. Religious influence is measured by Muslim status, the most 
consequential religious group for intermarriage in China due to how embedded its 
practices are in daily life (Zang, 2005). A province indicator is created for the seven 
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sampled areas and a provincial level fixed effect is included that captures province 
level differences. Lastly, age and age squared are controlled as continuous variables. 
1.4.3 Empirical Framework  
The primary interest of this paper is to estimate the economic returns to Han-
Minzu marriage, and test whether Han-Minzu marriage can alleviate the income 
inequality ethnic Minzu members face in the labor market. Therefore, we keep 
everyone who is of official working age (between 16 to 60) and in the labor market. 
To test the relationship between Han-Minzu marriage and earnings and to gain some 
traction on the causal nature of this relationship, we must disentangle earnings from 
other characteristics that contribute to a Han-Minzu intermarriage, or the reverse 
causal relationship between intermarriage and earnings. To this end, I use an 
instrumental variable approach.  
ln⁡(𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙⁡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑗
𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑀𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑍𝑈𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛾𝑘 + 𝑗⁡
𝑘    (1) 
:  random error, j: individual; k: province 
𝛾𝑘: province fixed effect 
IM: Han-Minzu marriage 
Equation (1) presents the baseline, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the 
economic returns to Han-Minzu intermarriage indexed by the log of annual earnings. 
The controls include Minzu status, Chinese Community Party membership, 
educational level, age, Muslim identity, rural to urban migrant worker status, self-
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employed status, and a provincial level fixed effect. With the presence of unobserved 
confounding factors that relate to both Han-Minzu intermarriage and earnings, the 
estimates from Equation (1) could be biased in either direction. Following the 
instrumental variable estimation strategy, I conduct the Two-Stage Least Squares 
regression (2SLS) specified in Equation (2) and Equation (3). Equation (2) represents 
the first-stage specification and Equation (2) is the second-stage estimation.  
𝐼𝑀𝑗
𝑘 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑃𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛾𝑘 + 𝑗⁡
𝑘             (2) 
ln⁡(𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙⁡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)𝑗
𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑀𝑗?̂? + 𝛽1𝑀𝐼𝑁𝑍𝑈𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛾𝑘 + 𝑗⁡
𝑘    (3) 
:  random error, j: individual; k: province  
𝛾𝑘: province fixed effect 
IM: Han-Minzu marriage 
EP: Ever had a local equal protection clause for Han-Ethnic Minzu 
intermarriage 
Atti: Support intermarriage for their children  
𝐼𝑀𝑗?̂?: predicted Han-Minzu intermarriage probability from Equation (2)  
where the dependent variable of Equation (2) is a binary variable, IM, indicating a 
Han-Minzu marriage j in province k. The key independent variables are 1) the binary 
indicator for ever having a local equal protection clause for Han-Ethnic Minzu (EP) 
intermarriage and 2) a binary indicator for a favorable attitude toward intermarriage 
for the respondents’ children (Atti). Other independent variables in Equation (2) 
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include a vector of individual level characteristics (X) including gender, Chinese 
Community Party membership, educational level, age, Muslim identity, and a 
provincial level fixed effect. 
An appropriate instrument must directly affect the key independent variable of 
interest (Han-Minzu intermarriage) but not be correlated with the dependent variable 
(earnings) (Greene, 2013). For the instrumental variables, I use a binary indicator of 
whether there has ever been a local regulation or amendment to the national marriage 
law that mentions equal protection for intermarriage (equal protection clause of Han-
Ethnic Minzu intermarriage); and an indicator of attitudes toward intermarriage for 
respondents’ children. From a marriage perspective, the equal protection clause 
directly affects the probability of intermarriage between Han and Minzu because it 
protects marital rights. This satisfies the ‘relevance assumption’ for instrumental 
variable selection (Greene, 2013). At the same time, an equal protection clause, itself, 
does not relate to earnings, satisfying the ‘exclusion restriction’ requirement for 
instrumental variables (Greene, 2013)5. 
 A major threat to the validity of the instrumental variable is the dynamic 
selection into Han-Minzu intermarriage. If an individual migrated to or out of their 
current location due to concerns about their marriage in terms of community support 
 
5 Province- and age-specific sex ratios helps control for selection into intermarriage, but it cannot 
control for the martial dissolution of individuals after they marry. 
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or cultural taboos, the equal protection clause at the migration destination does not 
necessarily apply to his/her probability of Han-Minzu marriage. While I do not have 
full information about migration incentives, one question in the CHES asks migrants 
who moved in the last year about their migration motivations. In this question, the 
response options do not include marriage, but respondents could include a marriage 
motivation in the “other” category. Only five percent of respondents chose “other,” 
and therefore marriage is an unlikely primary motivation for most in-migrants. Based 
on a study using Chinese Census data (Davin 2007) for the provinces in the CHES 
sample, only one province (Nei Mongol) has a sizeable proportion of in-migrants who 
may have migrated for marriage. Even in this case (Davin 2007), migrating for 
marriage is no more than 25% of all in-migration. For remarried individuals, the 
marriage market is slightly different than for those in first marriages, and the surplus 
of men could be either positively or negatively correlated with the probability of Han-
Minzu intermarriage. My estimates cannot distinguish the direction of bias. 
It is important to keep in mind that the instrumental variable estimates are local 
average treatment effects (LATE) that only apply to those whose decision to 
intermarry was affected by the equal protection clause in their current location (the 
"compliers"). Moreover, if Han-Minzu intermarriage would help alleviate the earning 
penalty faced by Minzu people, the LATE estimates could underestimate the positive 
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Han-Minzu intermarriage effect on income because the LATE estimates do not 
capture the effects of "always takers" of Han-Minzu intermarriage.  
My second instrument is attitudes toward inter-ethnic marriage. The China 
Household Ethnicity Survey 2011 asks respondents whether they agree that their 
children may marry persons from an ethnic group other than their own (Han or 
another ethnic group). I define a dichotomous instrument, equal to ‘1’ if the 
respondent supports (赞成) intermarriage for their children and ‘0’ for neutral (无所
谓) , as if they do not agree (不太赞同), are unclear, or do not have an opinion (说不
清). This instrumental variable meets the ‘relevance assumption’ in that the attitude 
positively corelates to intermarriage, and it also meets the ‘exclusion restriction’ 
because the attitude should not directly have an impact on earnings.  
 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Among the 41,733 interviewed individuals in CHES, 18,256 are married, and 1,866 
individuals are intermarried. Eighty percent of the intermarried individuals are Han-
Minzu intermarried (the remainder are in intermarriages between those of different 
Minzu groups or between Chinese nationals and non-Chinese). These 80 percent are 
the couples I refer to as “intermarried” or “interethnic.” Considering the structural 
differences between farm earnings and labor income (Li and Sicular, 2014), the 
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analytical sample is restricted to persons whose primary revenue in the year 2011 was 
from labor income, which includes rural local workers, rural to urban migrant workers 
and urban workers between the ages of 16 and 60. Therefore, my analytical sample 
has 9,028 married individuals with 1,042 of these respondents in Han-Minzu 
intermarriages. Fifty-four percent of the interethnic couples have a Han husband and a 
Minzu wife, which reveals a slight gender selection pattern in Han-Minzu 
intermarriage. For this reason, subsequent analysis will be separate for men (n=5,956) 
and woman (n=4,114). Figure 1.2 presents the annual earnings by marriage type and 
Minzu status separately for women and men. Intermarried individuals have higher 
average annual earnings than intramarried individuals. While there is no statistical 
difference in the average annual earnings of Han men and women who are in 
intermarriages compared to those in intramarriages, we can see statistically significant 
differences in the average annual earnings of Minzu men and women who are in 
intermarriages compared to those in intramarriages. 
[Insert Figure 1.2 here] 
Table 1.3 displays the descriptive characteristics separately for women and men. 
On average, intermarried individuals are less likely to live in rural areas or to be rural 
to urban migrant workers. Among Han-Minzu intermarried women, only nine percent 
are migrant workers, while 11 percent of intramarried women are migrant workers. 
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Men demonstrate an even greater contrast: eight percent of Han-Minzu intermarried 
men are migrant workers, while 18 percent of intramarried men are migrant workers. 
Those who are in Han-Minzu intermarriages are more likely to be CCP members than 
those who are not intermarried, which is true for both women and men. This may 
relate to the send-down policy of the 1950s, where the CCP sent a significant number 
of party members to western and rural China to enhance assimilation between Han 
and Minzu groups; this may have produced many Han-Minzu couples that include a 
CCP member.  
Consistent with existing theory, a much lower proportion of Muslims are in 
intermarriages than those from other religions; only one percent intermarried 
individuals are Muslims. The China Household Ethnicity Survey 2011 also confirms 
that higher educational achievement is associated with more Han-Minzu 
intermarriage. People who have any education beyond a high school diploma are 
more likely to be in Han-Minzu intermarriages. For example, for men who have a 
college degree or higher, the share of Han-Minzu intermarriage is more than 20 
percentage points higher as compared to those with only a high school degree. In 
short, descriptive statistics from the CHES sample are consistent with intermarriage 
patterns suggested by the literature, such as differential prevalence by Muslim 
religion and by educational attainment. 
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[Insert Table 1.3 here] 
Further, when partitioning the educational attainment by marriage type, we can 
see strong evidence of selection for Han-Minzu intermarriage at the upper end of the 
education distribution as Figure 1.3 suggests. About twice as many individuals with 
some college education or more are Han-Minzu intermarried, while for those with less 
than a high school degree the pattern goes in the opposite direction—they are more 
likely to marry within their ethnic groups. As Han-Minzu intermarried individuals are 
positively selected on education, it is reasonable to suspect they are also positively 
selected on other observed and unobserved traits that could also increase expected 
earnings, like abilities and motivation.  
 [Insert Figure 1.3 here] 
1.5.2 Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Least Squares Results 
Table 1.4 presents the main results for the effect of Han-Minzu intermarriage on 
income for women and men. Columns (1) and (4) show the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) results for the effect of Han-Minzu intermarriage on income for women on the 
left and men on the right. Without controlling the selection into Han-Minzu marriage, 
Han-Minzu intermarriage increases income for women by 13 percent and 12.5 percent 
for men. Columns (2) and (5) in Table 1.4 show the first stage of the IV estimation, 
regressing the probability of Han-Minzu intermarriage on the binary indicator of ever 
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having a local equal protection clause for Han-Ethnic Minzu intermarriage and a 
supportive attitude toward Han-Minzu intermarriage. As expected, supportive 
attitudes toward intermarriage are associated with a nine percent higher probability of 
being in an intermarriage for women and a seven percent higher probability for men. 
In contrast, ever having had a local equal protection clause for Han-Ethnic 
Minzu intermarriage statistically significant decreases the probability of Han-Minzu 
intermarriage for women by four percent and for men by five percent. The province 
and county ethnicity history can explain the negative association between an equal 
protection clause and the probability of intermarriage. As Appendix Table 1.2 
suggests, equal protection clauses are more common in provinces and counties where 
ethnic Minzu groups have stronger and deeper ethnic identities. Rather than the clause 
dampens the interracial marriage likelihood, the social pressure and potential criticism 
from the community intimidate people not to intermarry even with legal rights and 
protection. Columns (3) and (6) of Table 1.4 present the second stage of the IV 
results, the casual effect of Han-Minu intermarriage on earnings. With the 
instruments, the statistically significant effect from Han-Minzu intermarriage 
disappears for both women and men. With an F statistic of over 30 for both men and 
women, weak instruments are not a concern under the current specification. 
[Insert Table 1.4 here] 
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The intersectionality between gender and ethnicity may also introduce selection into 
Han-Minzu intermarriage. Consequently, the marriage effect on earnings may be 
different for ethnic-Minzu women and Han women and ethnic-Minzu men and Han 
men. Therefore, Table 1.5 presents the estimations separately by gender and ethnicity. 
Similar to the main results, the IV estimator does not generate statistically significant 
effects from intermarried status to earnings. Meanwhile, across specifications and 
gender, higher educational achievement greatly increases incomes for both inter- and 
intra-married men and women. More importantly, the impact of the same educational 
level on income is two times greater for women than men. Educational achievement 
plays the most important role in determining earnings among all the factors 
considered.6 This is consistent with human capital theory as an explanation for 
inequality in China.   
[Insert Table 1.5 here] 
Importantly, we need to understand that the IV estimates are the local average 
treatment effects (LATE) of an equal protection clause and supportive attitudes 
toward Han-Minzu intermarriage to income. The effect only applies to those whose 
decision to be Han-Minzu intermarried was affected by an equal protection clause 
(“compliers”). The effect is not necessarily applicable to those who will always get 
Han-Minzu intermarried (the “always takers”) or those who will remain single or 
 
6 The full regression results can be found in Appendix Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
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never be Han-Minzu intermarried (the “never takers”) regardless of the value of their 
instruments.  
 Besides the local average treatment effects (LATE), to address the concern 
that there might be a large number of defiers who violate the monotone assumption 
and a small number of compliers, I will apply the bounds estimation for the 
instrumental variable (Black, Berger and Scott, 2000; Manski and Pepper, 2000; 
Balke and Pearl, 1997). The bounded estimates provide the tightest returns from Han-
Ethnic Minzu intermarriages, given the distribution of compilers. 
 
1.6 Discussion and Policy Implications 
This study provides new evidence on the economic returns to Han-Minzu 
intermarriage by exploiting the plausibly exogenous marriage gains that are caused by 
laws and regulations as well as parental attitudes toward intermarriage. This paper 
indicates that the economic returns for Han and Minzu from Han-Minzu intermarriage 
are different after controlling for the selection into Han-Minzu intermarriage. These 
findings do not agree with the idea in the existing literature that Minzu women “marry 
up” with regard to income (Li, 2004). The non-significant intermarriage effect on 
earnings is consistent with prior findings in the literature that intermarried individuals 
face either a negative or non-significant wage premium (Meng and Gregory, 2005; 
Crowder and Tolnay, 2000). This new evidence contributes to our understanding of 
 32 
the preference and sorting mechanism, including educational assortative mating, in 
the marriage market in Western China. Through Guanxi is not directly observed in 
my dataset and I cannot draw any conclusion on Guanxi from my results, it is not hard 
to imagine the Han-ethnic Minzu intermarried individuals connect to new networks 
by marrying someone from a different ethnic group. The new connection may not be 
strong, but it brings exclusive information, cooperation, and even benefits to which 
outsiders do not otherwise have access.  
 My results are subject to several limitations. First, the CHES data, 
unfortunately, do not contain the marriage year or where respondents lived when they 
married. My instrument is valid for residents who live and marry at their current 
residential place, and not for migrants who migrated for marriage. Though China 
experiences vast rural to urban migration in the past three decades, the migrant share 
of the total population is less than 5 percent before 1995 (Lu and Xia, 2019), which is 
the cut-off birth year for the youngest people in my analytical sample. Thus, my 
instrument applies to most of the individuals in the sample. Second, my model and 
empirical analysis look into the effects of Han-Minzu intermarriage and earnings but 
do not take other dimensions into account, including the impacts of the one-child 
policy fertility incentives on Han-Minzu intermarriage. As Huang and Zhou (2015) 
and Huang et al. (2016) suggested, the one-child policy increased Minzu births, 
especially among Han-Minzu couples. Children from Han-Minzu couples are more 
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likely to intermarry. Therefore, among the children of Han-Minzu intermarried 
parents in the sample, my estimates may be upwardly biased. The first cohort of 
children from Han-Minzu couples under the one-child policy era are around thirty 
years old. Without knowing the parents’ ethnicity, I cannot estimate how large the 
bias may be. However, even the oldest cohort is much younger than the average age 
of my sample, which suggests any bias introduced by their inclusion is likely 
minimal.  
While still relatively small, the Minzu population in China is growing. Recent 
amendments to China’s constitution emphasize the importance of harmony and social 
cohesion between Han and Minzu. Marriage has long been considered a basic cell of 
society, an institution that promotes social and political stability (Fincher, 2016). Han-
Minzu intermarriage may be seen as one pathway to the harmony and social cohesion 
promoted by the Chinese government. My findings indicate that intermarriage is most 
common among those with higher levels of education, suggesting that the income 
benefit derived from Han-Minzu marriage accrues to those who already have some 
resources in the form of human capital. Therefore, in my sample, the benefits of Han-
Minzu intermarriage are for those who are already relatively advantaged. 
For scholars and policymakers who seek to promote intermarriage as a path to 
harmonious relations between Han and Minzu groups, their focus should be on those 
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persons at the lower end of the educational distribution where interethnic marriage is 
less common. Scholars and policymakers interested in marriage prospects should 
consider what, if any, unique benefits derive from marriage for this group. Finally, the 
Chinese government believes greater integration between ethnic groups is positive for 
China, but my findings indicate that no particular group statistically benefits 
economically from this most personal kind of integration – that of marriage. 
However, some scholars suggest that integration may also serve to erase the unique 
identities and cultures of Minzu groups in China -- homogenizing all Chinese to one 
Han culture. Future studies could seek an even more nuanced understanding of social 
cohesion and Minzu identity under the framework of inequality and marriage. 
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Figure 1. 1: Map of the CHES Provinces 
 
Note: Green represents province. 



















Figure 1. 2: Annual Earnings by Marriage Type in Western China  
 
Source: CHES 2011. 
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Source: CHES 2011. 











































Table 1. 1:Largest Ten Ethnic Minzu Groups in China 
  2010 Census   2015 1% Population Survey 
Own 
Language 









% Of Total 
Population 
Zhuang 16,926,381 1.27  279,744 1.31 Yes Guangxi Zhuang, South China 
Hui 10,586,087 0.79  175,072 0.82 No Ningxia Hui, whole country 
Manchu 10,387,958 0.78  165,186 0.78 No Northeast China 
Uyghur 10,069,346 0.76  172,258 0.81 Yes Xinjiang Uyghur 
Miao 9,426,007 0.71  144,707 0.68 Yes Whole country 
Yi 8,714,393 0.65  136,728 0.64 Yes Southeast China 
Tujia 8,353,912 0.63  138,383 0.65 Yes Hunan, Hubei, Chongqing 
Tibetan 6,282,187 0.47  108,114 0.51 Yes Xizang Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan 
Mongolian 5,981,840 0.45  95,960 0.45 Yes Nei Mongol, Northeast China 
Dong 2,879,974 0.22  47,409 0.22 Yes Guizhou, Hunan 
Total 89,608,085 6.72  1,463,561 6.87   
Source: Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China. 





Table 1. 2: Sample Size by Province and Autonomous Region in the 2011 CHES 
Province/Autonomous Region Sample Size Ethnic Minority Share 
in the CHES 
Population in 2010 
Census 
Ethnic Minority Share 
in the 2010 Census 
Hunan Province 6,202 70.32 65,700,762 9.97 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 6,367 57.17 46,023,761 37.17 
Guizhou Province 6,410 79.29 34,748,556 18.81 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region  5,786 47.50 6,301,350 35.15 
Qinghai Province 6,361 54.01 5,626,723 46.98 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region  5,634 66.54 21,815,815 59.52 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 4,973 28.19 24,706,291 20.46 
Total 41,733 58.43 204,923,258 25.91 
Source: Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China. 













Table 1. 3: Characteristics of Sample by Intermarried Status and Gender  










  Mean SD N 
 
Mean SD N 
 





Rural Residency 0.43 0.50 3,630  
 
0.21 0.41 484 
 
0.51 0.50 5,398 
 
0.26 0.44 558 
Minzu 0.29 0.45 3,630  
 
0.33 0.47 484 
 
0.33 0.47 5,398 
 
0.28 0.45 558 
Migrant worker 0.11 0.32 3,630 
 
0.09 0.28 484 
 
0.18 0.39 5,398 
 
0.08 0.27 558 
Muslim 0.11 0.31 3,630 
 
0.01 0.12 484 
 
0.15 0.36 5,398 
 
0.01 0.10 558 
Member of Communist Party of China 0.12 0.32 3,630 
 
0.19 0.39 484 
 
0.22 0.41 5,398 
 
0.34 0.47 558 
Education:                
No schooling 0.05 0.21 3,630 
 
0.01 0.11 484 
 
0.02 0.14 5,398 
 
0.01 0.09 558 
Less than High School 0.54 0.50 3,630 
 
0.37 0.48 484 
 
0.55 0.50 5,398 
 
0.37 0.48 558 
Technical High School or Upper College 0.08 0.27 3,630 
 
0.13 0.34 484 
 
0.07 0.25 5,398 
 
0.09 0.29 558 
High school 0.12 0.33 3,630 
 
0.15 0.36 484 
 
0.16 0.36 5,398 
 
0.14 0.34 558 
Some College 0.12 0.32 3,630 
 
0.20 0.40 484 
 
0.11 0.31 5,398 
 
0.19 0.40 558 
College or higher degrees 0.08 0.28 3,630 
 
0.11 0.32 484 
 
0.08 0.28 5,398 
 
0.17 0.38 558 
Living in autonomous region 0.61 0.49 3,630 
 
0.34 0.48 484 
 
0.60 0.49 5,398 
 
0.36 0.48 558 
Age 41.30 9.68 3,630   41.95 9.25 484   42.21 9.55 5,398   43.7
5 
8.52 558 
Source: CHES 2011. 









Table 1. 4: The Impact of Han-Minzu Intermarriage on Income in Western China  
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Female  Male 
 OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage  OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
Han-Minzu Intermarriage 0.1317*** . 0.1598  0.1254*** . -0.0979 
 (0.0507) (.) (0.3640)  (0.0375) (.) (0.3751) 
Minzu Status -0.1153*** 0.0785*** -0.1118**  -0.1589*** 0.0235** -0.1617*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0141) (0.0511)  (0.0278) (0.0114) (0.0321) 
Ever had a local equal protection clause of Han-Ethnic Minzu  -0.0412**    -0.0484**  
  (0.0187)    (0.0224)  
Support Han-Minzu Intermarriage  0.0919***    0.0666***  
  (0.0124)    (0.0099)  
Instrument F-statistics  31.5716    25,3868  
Observations 4,114 4,045 4,045  5,956 5,855 5,855 
Source: CHES 2011. 
Notes: Table1.4 includes married people ages 16 to 60. Weights are applied to the analysis. 












Table 1. 5: The Impact of Han-Minzu Intermarriage on Income in Western China by Gender and Ethnicity 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 












Han-Minzu Intermarriage 0.0677 . 0.5588  0.2663*** . 0.1852 
 (0.0792) (.) (0.8654)  (0.0482) (.) (0.4005) 
Ever had a local equal protection clause of Han-Ethnic Minzu  -0.0469    -0.1985***  
  (0.0448)    (0.0273)  
Support Han-Minzu Intermarriage  0.0591***    0.0227*  
  (0.0177)    (0.0127)  
Instrument F-statistics  6.2413    27.7839  
Observations 2,099 2,072 2,072  3,266 3,214 3,214 
        
 (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 











Han-Minzu Intermarriage 0.1336** . -0.0164  0.0766 . -0.1007 
 (0.0672) (.) (0.4640)  (0.0495) (.) (0.4331) 
Ever had a local equal protection clause of Han-Ethnic Minzu  -0.0451*    0.1013**  
  (0.0251)    (0.0395)  
Support Han-Minzu Intermarriage  0.0997***    0.0795***  
  (0.0171)    (0.0148)  
Instrument F-statistics  19.4717    17.771  
Observations 2,015 1,973 1,973  2,690 2,641 2,641 
Source: CHES 2011. 
Notes: Table1.5 includes married people ages 16 to 60. Weights are applied to the analysis. 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 43 
 
Essay Two: Linking the Supply of Marriageable Males to the Formation of 




2.1 Introduction  
It is a common belief that a man heads a Chinese family. This idea is displayed on the 
official page for household heads in the Chinese household registration system (Hu 
Kou, 户口). It is assumed widely in social life as men are called the family decision-
makers (Yi Jia Zhi Zhu, 一家之主 or Zhu Xin Gu, 主心骨). This pattern is also 
typical for dual-earner families and is a deeply held belief related to male preferences 
and gender inequality (Zuo and Bian, 2001). Along with Chinese marriage and family 
structure changes, female-headed households or female headships have emerged in 
China. Recent births cohorts express more egalitarian attitudes towards female 
headship in both labor market outcomes and private family affairs (Qian and Li, 
2020). Scholars posit that emerging Chinese female headship is related to internal 
migration (Goldstein et al., 1997; Mu and Van de Walle, 2011; Ye et al., 2013; 
Cheung and Yeung, 2015; Chen et al., 2015), the evolution of gender equity (Zuo, 
2003; Qian and Sayer, 2016; Ji, et al., 2017; Ye and Zhao, 2018), and high 
educational achievement (Ji, 2015). 
 My interest is in investigating the link between the supply of marriageable 
males and the formation of unmarried female family headship while examining the 
trends in unmarried female family headship in China from 1982 to 2000. Unmarried 
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female family headship in China is less well-studied, and differences between Han 
and Minzu are largely ignored. For example, Xie, Cheng, and Zhou (2015) and Dong 
and Xie (2018) have discussed the mechanisms and consequences for female family 
headship arising from the surplus of males in China without a detailed analysis of 
ethnic differences. With the limited literature on female family headship in China, this 
paper contributes to the literature by providing an empirical test of marriageable 
males on family structure among Minzu vs. Han in China. Further, the paper will test 
the disparate ethnic impacts of male marriageability and unmarried female headship 
between Minzu vs. Han in China. 
Female family headship in the United States has attracted much attention from 
different disciplines. Competing models of family formation emerge from the 
economics, sociology, and demography literatures (Becker 1973, 1974a, 1974b; 
Moffitt and Rendall, 1995; Lichter et al., 1997; Angrist, 2002). A key insight from the 
literature highlights that male marriageability affects changes in family structure 
(Cox, 1940; Darity and Myers, 1984 and 1995; Wilson and Neckerman,1986; Raley, 
1996; Wilson, 2012; Craigie, Darity and Myers, 2018). Cox (1940) first used the sex 
ratio as a measure of male marriageability. According to Becker’s theory of marriage 
(Becker, 1973, 1974a, and1981), economic benefits drive many marriages.  A woman 
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will marry if the economic benefits from marriage exceed those gained outside of 
marriage. Therefore, the economic desirability7 of males in the marriage market 
matters more than just the quantity of males. Later, Wilson and Neckerman (1986) 
confirmed the relationship between employed males and marriage rates. However, 
Cox (1940) and Wilson and Neckerman (1986) combine both married and unmarried 
males together in their measures of marriageable males, which does not specifically 
speak to the current supply of marriageable males.  
As an advancement, Darity and Myers (1995) use the ratio of unmarried males 
in the labor force or in school to unmarried females to measure male marriageability 
(hereafter D-M ratio). In their study of the racial and ethnic differences in family 
formation in the United States, they found a strong and consistent inverse relationship 
between the availability of marriageable Black males and the formation of Black 
female-headed families. They highlight that a decline in the supply of marriageable 
males threatens the structure of Black families and increases poverty among female-
headed households. Raley (1996) concurs with Darity and Myers (1995). Utilizing the 
National Survey of Families and Households, Raley provides clear evidence that male 
 
7 The author acknowledges that economic desirability is an objective word and may be offensive to 
some people. It only means the economic desirability or ability of men in this easy. 
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employment characteristics contribute to female marriage rates. Lower employment 
rates among Black men explain the lower likelihood that Black women will marry or 
cohabit. However, without specifying the difference across Blacks and whites, 
Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) and Angrist (2002) empirically conclude that a 
higher sex ratio increases women’s bargaining power in the marriage market. These 
two studies continue to add evidence about the relationship between marriageable 
males and female headship. 
Recently, Craigie, Myers and Darity (2018) updated estimates of the 
relationship between rising female family headship and the decline in the supply of 
marriageable men in the U.S. and accounted for such factors as mass incarceration 
and sentencing reforms. Unlike the analysis for data from the 1970s and 1980s, the 
findings for the post-1990s era show racially disparate impacts of male 
marriageability and female headship. Using the exogenous variation in state-level 
sentencing reforms as an instrument in estimating male marriageability, the updated 
analysis again finds a significant inverse relationship between male marriageability 
and female headship for Blacks, but with a smaller impact of incarceration on family 
formation. 
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Empirical studies in the U.S. on the role of male marriageability in explaining 
female headship offer a useful framework to approach the formation of female-headed 
households in China. Unlike the United States, where there is a problem of male 
scarcity, China has a persistent problem of male surplus, as shown in figure 2.1. 
Therefore, following the language of Becker, the ‘quality’ 8of males is more 
important than the quantity of males since there is a surplus. Quality in the marriage 
market is defined as the attractiveness of males as good potential husbands, such as 
employment, which highly correlates with strong economic abilities. Consequently, in 
this paper, I will adapt and revise the D-M ratio that has previously been used in the 
USA to the Chinese context to account for the surplus of males. The revised D-M 
ratio is the ratio of employed unmarried males to unmarried females. In addition, the 
research on black female headship in the U.S. is particularly relevant in China 
because Minzu in China, like Blacks in the United States, are marginalized in many 
respects. They have lower earnings (Gustafsson and Li, 2003; Chen and Hamori 
2009; Wu and He, 2016), higher poverty rates and lower educational attainment 
 
8 The author acknowledges that male quality is an objective word and may be offensive to some 
people. It only means the economic desirability or ability of men in this easy. 
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(Gustafsson and Zhong, 2000; Myers et al., 2013) than Han majority group members 
and face significant discrimination in many markets. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
My inquiry into female headship and a Chinese adaptive measure of 
marriagible males contributes to the broad literature on family structure and 
inequality. As my measure acknowledges the economic ability of men in the marriage 
market, it will inform the extent to which female-headed households have formed and 
changed in China in the post-1980s period and the nature of ethnic differences among 
such households. 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section lays out the conceptual 
framework and introduces the data sources. Section 2.3 describes the characteristics 
of female heads and summarizes the D-M ratios. Section 2.4 presents the results and 
illustrates the link between female headship and the D-M ratio and demonstrates the 
ethnic difference among the links. Finally, I discuss possible channels and conclude 
the paper in section 2.5. 
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2.2 The Conceptual Framework and Data  
Men face a potential marriage squeeze when the sex ratio is above one. Specifically, a 
surplus of men is present when the sex ratio is larger than the upper bound of 
balanced sex ratios (108:100, by the definition of the World Health Organization). 
From a marriage perspective, the surplus of men directly affects the probability of 
marriage because it accounts for the marriage market’s population composition 
(Angrist, 2002 and Edlund, et al., 2013). Since 1982, China has had a sex ratio at birth 
greater than 110 (UNICEF, 2018). The surplus of men grants the credibility that only 
include employed men as the numerator of the revised D-M ratio to calculate the 
marriageability.  
Consequently, the D-M ratio for China is the ratio of employed unmarried males 
between the ages of 20 to 50 to unmarried females between the ages of 20 to 50. The 
lower bound of age accounts for the minimum legal marriage age. Equation (1) for the 




                        (1) 
Where i represent the 5-year age interval staring from age of 20, and j denotes 
Minzu or Han. Conceptually, when the D-M ratio is above 1, it means there are more 
unmarried employed males than unmarried females by age interval and by Han-Minzu 
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ethnic identity.  Next, I use equation (2) to estimate the association between the 
female headship and males’ marriageability, namely the D-M ratio:  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿𝐷𝑀𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑧𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is an indicator for female head of household 18 or older i residing 
in province s in census year t. It equals 1 for a currently unmarried female head of 
household 18 or older and equals 0 for a married female head over the age of 18. The 
key independent variable is 𝛿⁡𝐷𝑀𝑠𝑡, a 5-year age specific ratio. Θ represents the 
Ethnic Minzu identity.⁡𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of characteristics that the literature suggests 
influence female headship, such as education level, and migration status. 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 
represents the age of individual i residing in state s in census year t. 𝛼𝑠 and 𝛾𝑡  are 
state and census year fixed effects, respectively, and 𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the conventional error 
term. The specification is also separate for Han and ethnic Minzu to detect the 
disparate effect between ethnic Minzu and Han people. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between the supply of marriageable 
males and the share of female-headed households. African Americans in the United 
States and China represent two extremes on the figure 2.2. For African Americans in 
the United States, the share of female-headed households is high and increases with 
the declining supply of marriageable males. In contrast, for China, with a D-M ratio 
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above 1, the share of female-headed households remains low. That is to say, 
theoretically there should be an inverse relationship between the probability of an 
unmarried female head of household and the availability of marriageable males. In 
addition, given the well documented evidence on employment disparities for ethnic 
Minzu, I would expect there are disparate impacts of male marriageability and female 
headship among ethnic Minzu than Han, the majority ethnic group. 
 To examine the above framework in the context of China, the impact of the 
supply of marriageable males on the formation of female-headed households, I use the 
one percent China Censuses of 1982, 1990 2000 from IPUMS-International.  
[Insert Figure 2.2 here] 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Female Headship in China   
Table 2.1 presents unmarried female headship by census. Among all the female 
household heads, more than 35 percent are headed by single females aged 18 and 
older. The overall trend increases slightly from 1982 to 2000. Besides, starting at a 
higher number, share of unmarried ethnic Minzu female family headships also goes 
up in the same years. Thus, there is a disparity between Han and ethnic Minzu in 
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terms of unmarried female headship. To get a better idea of the regional variations for 
the share of unmarried female headship, figure 2.3 visualizes the share of unmarried 
female heads by year and by ethnicity.9 In contrast with the national average, eastern 
and central regions have a higher share of Han unmarried female headship, and the 
Han number drives the overall number. Following population density by ethnicity, the 
western region, an area that traditionally has a larger ethnic Minzu population, has the 
highest share of ethnic Minzu female heads of household.   
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2.3 here] 
Taking a closer look at the characteristics of unmarried female heads of 
household, from the marriage perspective, Table 2.2 presents unmarried female heads 
under the age of 50. On average, unmarried ethnic Minzu female heads are a little bit 
older than Han. This relates to the higher percentage of ethnic Minzu female heads in 
their 30s and 40s, while there is a higher percentage of Han female heads younger 
than 25 years old. Meanwhile, more than 80 percent of female heads are employed, 
indicating they have some economic independence and stability. However, combined 
 
9 The region division is based on the standard from the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The 
details can be found at: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/ztjc/zthd/sjtjr/dejtjkfr/tjkp/201106/t20110613_71947.htm 
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with their educational achievement, 80 percent of female heads have only finished 
primary school or less and may not work in a well-paid occupation. Within the low 
educational attainment of unmarried female heads, there is a disparity between Han 
and ethnic Minzu female heads. A higher proportion of ethnic Minzu heads have 
completed less than primary education level, while higher proportion of Han heads 
have completed primary and secondary level of education. 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
Meanwhile, about one third of Han female heads have migrated across 
provinces and display a higher mobility than their ethnic Minzu peers. Though 
currently unmarried, more than half of the female heads have been previously 
married, including almost 80 percent of ethnic Minzu who have been married. In 
addition, Han female heads on average have 1.11 children who live with them, while 
for ethnic Minzu, the number is more than 1.58, which is consistent with the 
exemption of the One-child policy.  
2.3.2 Revised D-M Ratios from the Censuses  
For ease of presentation, I summarize the revised D-M ratios by ethnicity in figure 
2.4. In spite of apparent regional variation and differences, uniformly, all regions have 
a revised D-M ratio greater than one, meaning there are more unmarried and 
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employed males than unmarried females regardless of ethnic identity. Except for the 
Northeast, Han always displays a higher revised D-M ratio, however, by the year 
2000, the pattern had reversed for Han and ethnic Minzu wherein ethnic Minzu had a 
higher D-M ratio than Han10. Looking at figure 2.3 and figure 2.4 together, we have 
clear evidence of a negative relationship between the supply of marriageable males 
and the formation of unmarried female heads because the number of female heads 
grew in the 1982 to 2000 censuses, while the revised D-M ratios declined in the same 
years. 
[Insert Figure 2.4 here] 
 
2.4. Results 
Applying the theoretical framework in figure 2.2 to the one-percent China censuses, 
table 2.3 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates between the supply of 
marriageable males and the share of unmarried female-headed households for females 
between ages 18 and 50. The first three columns of table 2.3 show the combined 
results for Han and ethnic Minzu. As expected from the framework, when the revised 
D-M ratio increases by one unit, it negatively relates to the probability of being an 
 
10 The province level D-M ratios can be found in the appendix figure 1. 
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unmarried female head by 1 percentage point. Moreover, compared with Han, ethnic 
Minzu females are 5 percentage points more likely to be unmarried female heads. 
With the statistically significant coefficient on ethnic Minzu identity, I examine Han 
and ethnic Minzu separately to test the disparate impact.  
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
Unlike the overall effect, there is no statistically significant effect from the 
revised D-M ratio on the formation of unmarried Han female headship (column (4) to 
column (6)), and the coefficient magnitude is minimal. In contrast, for ethnic Minzu 
(column (7) to column (9)), the statistically significant inverse relationship between 
the supply of marriageable males and the share of female-headed families is 
consistent across model specifications. That is to say, there is a disparate ethnic 
relationship between male marriageability and female headship between ethnic Minzu 
and Han in China. In addition, the coefficient on the revised D-M ratio for ethnic 
Minzu only is at least three times larger than the overall association. Therefore, the 
empirical evidence from the one percent China censuses supports both the reserve 
relationship between marriageable males and the formation of unmarried female 
headship and the disparate effect for the ethnic Minzu group.  
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Addressing the emergent late marriage pattern in China (Qian and Qian, 
2014), table 2.4 narrows the sample down to females aged 30 to 50. Derogatory but 
widely called “leftover women” (Sheng Nü, 剩女), women who remain unmarried in 
their late twenties and beyond may face more pressure from anxious parents if they 
live without a husband (Ji, 2015). Therefore, one could expect a stronger association 
between available men in the marriage market and the likelihood of getting married 
for older women. However, the estimates from 1982 to 2000 censuses do not support 
this hypothesis. I find no statistically significant relationship between the revised D-M 
ratio to the probability of being an unmarried household head for women aged 30 to 
50. One possible reason behind the insignificant coefficient of the revised D-M ratio 
is the cohorts or birth years included in the 1982 to 2000 censuses. The youngest 
women older than 30 in my sample were born in 1970. The social norms and 
environment of the 1980s and 1990s were conservative to unmarried females if they 
were selective in the marriage market. Therefore, there are reasons beyond the supply 
of males in the marriage market for women being unmarried. Although less likely to 
happen before the year 2000 and only a few in my sample, we need to recognize that 
Westernized and independent professional women are different. Their economic 
independence could afford to defy traditional Chinese norms and remain single and 
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childless. Consequently, my analysis and the measure of marriageable males may not 
apply to these women.  
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
Similar to late marriage, remarriage may differ from first marriage (Wang and 
Zhou, 2010). To avoid potential bias from combining never-married female heads 
with separated, divorced, or widowed female heads, table 2.5 isolates never-married 
females heads as the interest group. Consistent with the main specifications in table 
2.3, once the sample is restricted to never married female heads, men’s economic 
desirability negatively relates to the probability of female headship by about one 
percentage point. Furthermore, the disparate ethnic Minzu effect continues to never-
married females. When controlling for migration status, human capital, age, and 
province difference, for Han, when the revised D-M ratio increases by one, it 
decreases the probability of being an unmarried female head by 0.64 percentage 
points, while the magnitude for ethnic Minzu is 2.23 percentage points. 
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
More than a purely individual choice, females face a structural constraint in 
choosing a husband and being the household head (England and Farkas, 1986; 
England and McClintock, 2009). Qian and Qian (2014) find that in urban China, there 
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is an age hypogamy for highly educated females. At the same time, Mu and Xie 
(2014) indicate that due to economic pressure, there is age hypergamy in China and 
imply a future ‘marriage squeeze for men of low socioeconomic status.’ 
Consequently, I apply different age upper bounds for men and women for the revised 
D-M ratio to account for the age hypergamy. Specifically, I extend the upper bound 
for males age to 60 and still use 50 as the female’s upper bound in the revised D-M 
ratio and report the results in table 2.6. There is no statistically significant relationship 
between age hypergamy in the revised D-M ratio and the formation of unmarried 
female household heads, regardless of Han or ethnic Minzu. 
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
Focusing on migration status, my results suggest that migrants who moved 
across provinces in the past five years are statistically more likely to be household 
heads than non-migrants by at least 5 percentage points. Although the censuses do not 
provide insight into the motivation for migration, the rapid urbanization and economic 
development of 1980s and 1990s China, moving in search of job opportunities is 
likely the reason for migration. This finding once again emphasizes the importance of 
economic stability from a marriage perspective.  
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In sum, utilizing one percent China censuses, my examination concludes that 
the supply of marriageable males is inversely related to the formation of female 
headed households. As expected, ethnic Minzu females experienced a disparate 
impact of headship from the revised D-M ratio in China. This finding is robust to 
never married female headship but does not support the age hypergamy theory. And 
compared to the estimates from the U.S. where there is a surplus of women, my 
estimation has a stronger effect on ethnic Minzu than results on blacks found in the 
U.S. data (Craigie, Myers, and Darity, 2018).   
 
2.5. Discussion and Policy Implications 
Examining the supply of marriageable males and prevalence of female 
headship offers some insight into why there is an increase in female headship despite 
a skewed sex ratio in China. The conventional wisdom of the marriage squeeze for 
Chinese men stresses the oversupply of males in the marriage market but does not 
give attention or measure the economic attractiveness of men. Therefore, my revised 
D-M ratio embraces both the quantity (unmarried) and desirability (employed) of men 
in the marriage market. Though there is always a high supply of marriageable men in 
the marriage market, it is also significant that Han-ethnic disparities exist in the 
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revised D-M ratios. Thus, we can think of the difference in female headship, not 
claiming a causal effect, as associated with ethnic disparities in the supply of 
marriageable males. Although the revised D-M ratios are separate for Han and ethnic 
Minzu and do not exclude people who would be interethnic married, illustrations from 
2000 and 2010 Censuses and analyses from essays one demonstrate that the national 
interethnic married couple share is less the 3 percent. Therefore, I would expect the 
effect from interethnic marriage to the revised D-M ratios is minimal. 
Incorporating the debate about the under count of females in Chinese censuses 
(Cai and Levely, 2003; Ebenstein, 2010; Bulte, Heerink, and Zhang, 2011), it may 
also undercount female heads of households. Unable to determine the bias direction 
from undercounted females, it sheds light on female headship under the two-child 
policy or even the third-child policy (starting in June 2021) eras. Expecting to have at 
least one son (Yao and Delgado, 2020; Peng, 2020), parents are selective about the 
sex of their second child, thus it is not hard to imagine that it will increase the male 
marriage squeeze. Meanwhile, women obtain the same education as men and can be 
more selective about their husbands or remaining single with economic independency. 
Therefore, one implication to reduce the future male marriage squeeze is reduce labor 
market disparities for ethnic Minzu men. 
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Inquiring into China’s high sex ratio puzzle, one still must confront the 
evidence of a growing trend of unmarried female headship. My findings suggest the 
economic ability of unmarried males matters to the growth of unmarried female 
heads. With different levels of the supply of unmarried and employed males, ethnic 
Minzu females are differentially affected by the supply of marriageable men, and 
consequently have a higher probability of being household heads. The descriptive 
evidence on the lower supply of economic desirability of ethnic Minzu men vs. 
majority Han is compelling but not formally tested. In future research, I will test the 
hypothesis that the lower D-M ratios for ethnic Minzu are due to labor market 
disparities.  
 My results also have policy implications for family demographers and 
policymakers who seek to tackle the surplus of men in China. On the one hand, the 
decades-long, one-child policy produces and increases arranged brides and some bride 
trafficking from Southeast and South Asia. On the other hand, domestically, China is 
experiencing an upward trend of female family headship. The connection between the 
two sides of the puzzle is the economic disadvantage of unmarried or surplus Chinese 
men. Thus, providing employment opportunities and increasing the availability of 
jobs are never outdated for a policy agenda. In particular, as suggested by the 
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literature, ethnic Minzu men face penalties in entering labor markets and during job 
interviews. Providing policy-induced education opportunities and reducing workplace 
stereotypes can be practical policy tools. Additionally, reacting strategically to the 
labor market penalties, already having roots in ethnic Minzu employment, ethnic 
Minzu entrepreneurship and self-employment are alternative pathways to increasing 
the economic desirability of surplus men.  
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Figure 2. 3: Share of Female Headship by Regions  
 









Figure 2. 4: Revised D-M Ratio by Region, Same Upper Age Bound for Males 
and Females 
 
Source: IPUMS-I 1% China Census, 1982-2000. 
Note: D-M Ratio equals to unmarried employed males to unmarried females, 







Table 2. 1: Female Headship by Census and Ethnic Minzu Status 
 unmarried female headship  
Han unmarried  
female headship  
Ethnic Minzu unmarried 
female headship 
 (N) share (%)  (N) share (%)  (N) share (%) 
1982 126,786 34.77  119,244 34.35  7,194 43.32 
1990 141,501 35.82  131,832 35.37  9,226 44.05 
2000 182,641 37.77  168,798 37.31  13,098 44.41 
Average 150,309 36.12  139,958 35.68  9,839 43.93 








Table 2. 2: Characteristics of Unmarried Female Headship by Census and Ethnic Minzu Status 
 Han, under age of 50  Ethnic Minzu, under age of 50 
Difference between 
Han and Ethnic Minzu  
 Mean St. Dev. N  Mean St. Dev. N % 
Age: 34.15 11.18 118,421  36.18 10.41 11,725 -5.94 
18 <=age<24 0.32 0.47 118,421  0.22 0.41 11,725 31.25 
25 <=age<30 0.09 0.28 118,421   0.09 0.29 11,725 0.00 
30 <=age<40 0.18 0.39 118,421   0.22 0.42 11,725 -22.22 
40<=age<50 0.36 0.48 118,421   0.4 0.49 11,725 -11.11 
Education:         
Less than primary completed  0.22 0.42 118,421   0.38 0.49 11,725 -72.73 
Primary completed  0.51 0.5 118,421   0.41 0.49 11,725 19.61 
Secondary completed  0.25 0.43 118,421   0.2 0.4 11,725 20.00 
University completed  0.02 0.14 118,421   0.01 0.12 11,725 50.00 
Employed  0.81 0.39 118,421   0.86 0.34 11,725 -6.17 
Migrated across province 5 years ago 
 (Only for year of 1990 and 2000) 0.33 0.47 93,879  0.23 0.42  9,245 30.30 
Married before 0.59 0.49 118,421  0.7 0.46 11,725 -18.64 
Number of own children in the household 1.11 1.41 118,421   1.58 1.65 11,725 -42.34 
Rural, only for year of 2000 0.47 0.5 66,414   0.68 0.46 6,208 -44.68 
Source: IPUMS-I 1% China Census, 1982-2000. 
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Table 2. 3: OLS Estimates between the Revised D-M Ratios and Unmarried Female Headship 
 All Han Ethnic Minzu 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Han Ethnic Minzu 
Ethnic Minzu 0.0535*** 0.0544** 0.0567***       
 (0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0198)       
County level revised D-M Ratios  -0.0124* -0.0096* -0.0074* -0.0073 -0.0121 -0.0093 -0.0426** -0.0393* -0.0362* 
 (0.0066) (0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0079) (0.0097) (0.0070) (0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0180) 
Employed  0.0093** 0.0050  0.0082 0.0025  0.0292** 0.0282** 
  (0.0044) (0.0036)  (0.0068) (0.0056)  (0.0120) (0.0110) 
Migrated across province 5 years ago 
 0.0940*** 0.0537***  0.0834*** 0.0426***  0.1136*** 0.0615*** 
  (0.0101) (0.0065)  (0.0081) (0.0065)  (0.0132) (0.0108) 
Has at least one child in family   -0.1973***   
-
0.1958***   -0.2666*** 
   (0.0124)   (0.0116)   (0.0129) 
          
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Educational Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.0074*** 0.9483*** 0.9997*** 0.9999*** 0.9417*** 0.9924*** 0.9965*** 0.9214*** 0.9910*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.0147) (0.0109) (0.0654) (0.0696) (0.0669) 
Observations 747,011 747,011 747,011 704,944 704,944 704,944 42,067 42,067 42,067 
R squared overall 0.221 0.226 0.252 0.230 0.255 0.270 0.154 0.157 0.194 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Source: IPUMS-I 1% China Census, 1982-2000. 
Note: Table 2.3 includes females between ages 18 to 50.  
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Table 2. 4: OLS Estimates between the Revised D-M Ratios and Unmarried Older Female Headship 
 All Han Ethnic Minzu 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ethnic Minzu 0.0697*** 0.0697*** 0.0706***       
 (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0231)       
County level revised D-M Ratios  -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0022 0.0035 0.0036 0.0037 -0.0344 -0.0352 -0.0345 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0209) 
Employed  0.0016 0.0011  0.0002 -0.0004  0.0285** 0.0301** 
  (0.0031) (0.0031)  (0.0033) (0.0032)  (0.0122) (0.0116) 
Migrated across province 5 years ago 
 0.0025 -0.0101  0.0051 -0.0072  -0.0187 -0.0364* 
  (0.0060) (0.0068)  (0.0057) (0.0065)  (0.0176) (0.0182) 
Has at least one child in family   -0.0751***   -0.0732***   -0.1175*** 
   (0.0076)   (0.0074)   (0.0117) 
          
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Educational Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1223*** 0.1207*** 0.1954*** 0.1045*** 0.1040*** 0.1774*** 0.2833*** 0.2590*** 0.3685*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0133) (0.0562) (0.0522) (0.0504) 
          
Observations 542,149 542,149 542,149 512,385 512,385 512,385 29,764 29,764 29,764 
R squared overall 0.0591 0.0591 0.0630 0.0511 0.0511 0.0549 0.0856 0.0848 0.0914 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Source: IPUMS-I 1% China Census, 1982-2000. 
Note: Table 2.4 includes females between ages 30 to 50.  
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Table 2. 5: OLS Estimates between the Revised D-M Ratios and Never Married Female Headship 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: IPUMS-I 1% China Census, 1982-2000. 
Note: Table 2.5 includes never married females between ages 18 to 50.  
 All Han Ethnic Minzu 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ethnic Minzu 0.0044 0.0054 0.0072*       
 (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0038)       
County level revised D-M Ratios  -0.0134* -0.0098* -0.0075** -0.0121 -0.0086 -0.0064* -0.0326*** -0.0277** -0.0223** 
 (0.0068) (0.0049) (0.0031) (0.0073) (0.0053) (0.0035) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0083) 
Employed  0.0079** 0.0020  0.0079** 0.0022  0.0019 -0.0046 
  (0.0038) (0.0026)  (0.0037) (0.0025)  (0.0069) (0.0055) 
Migrated across province 5 years ago 
 0.1163*** 0.0739***  0.1144*** 0.0735***  0.1364*** 0.0745*** 
  (0.0115) (0.0048)  (0.0118) (0.0052)  (0.0139) (0.0096) 
Has at least one child in family   -0.2030***   -0.1966***   -0.3146*** 
   (0.0161)   (0.0165)   (0.0165) 
          
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Educational Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Constant 0.9636*** 0.8936*** 0.9469*** 0.9650*** 0.8957*** 0.9472*** 0.9202*** 0.8508*** 0.9366*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0157) (0.0067) (0.0075) (0.0151) (0.0072) (0.0261) (0.0319) (0.0213) 
          
Observations 668,402 668,402 668,402 634,566 634,566 634,566 33,836 33,836 33,836 
R squared overall 0.565 0.579 0.633 0.572 0.586 0.637 0.465 0.483 0.586 
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Table 2. 6: OLS Estimates between the Age Hypogamy Revised D-M Ratios and Unmarried Female Headship 
 All Han Ethnic Minzu 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ethnic Minzu 0.0542*** 0.0549** 0.0572***       
 (0.0193) (0.0198) (0.0199)       
County level revised D-M Ratios  -0.0073 -0.0051 -0.0032 -0.0046 -0.0025 -0.0007 -0.0227 -0.0204 -0.0185 
 (0.0060) (0.0049) (0.0039) (0.0071) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0137) 
Employed  0.0093** 0.0050  0.0080* 0.0037  0.0291** 0.0281** 
  (0.0044) (0.0036)  (0.0045) (0.0037)  (0.0122) (0.0112) 
Migrated across province 5 years ago 
 0.0943*** 0.0541***  0.0937*** 0.0544***  0.1157*** 0.0633*** 
  (0.0102) (0.0065)  (0.0103) (0.0069)  (0.0127) (0.0104) 
Has at least one child in family   -0.1974***   -0.1935***   -0.2672*** 
   (0.0124)   (0.0125)   (0.0126) 
          
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Educational Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Constant 0.9982*** 0.9397*** 0.9911*** 0.9952*** 0.9378*** 0.9883*** 0.9706*** 0.8951*** 0.9664*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0168) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0152) (0.0114) (0.0701) (0.0738) (0.0712) 
Observations 747,010 747,010 747,010 704,944 704,944 704,944 42,066 42,066 42,066 
R squared overall 0.221 0.225 0.251 0.225 0.230 0.255 0.150 0.153 0.191 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Source: IPUMS-I 1% China Census, 1982-2000. 
Note: Table 2.6 includes females between ages 18 to 50. 
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Essay Three: Anti-Miscegenation Laws, Chinese Exclusion Acts and Interracial 







This essay examines the impact of the passage of Asian/Chinese anti-Miscegenation 
laws on the interracial marriage outcomes for Chinese Americans from 1880 to 1940. 
Not a familiar term for most people, miscegenation means a marriage of people from 
two races (Browning, 1951). In the U.S. context, anti-miscegenation laws denote laws 
that prohibit and criminalize interracial marriage, largely forbidding marriage 
between whites and non-whites. Rooted in the persistent idea of racial purity, whites 
colonialists in Maryland and Virginia first enacted anti-miscegenation laws to 
preserve “racial integrity” and privileges. Effective for more than two hundred years 
in the U.S., anti-miscegenation laws deny basic civil rights and freedom of choice to 
marry (Loving v. Virginia, 1967). In addition, the enduring discrimination and 
stereotypes produced under the system profoundly shape public opinion of racial and 
ethnic groups. Brought to the U.S. for economic development, Chinese laborers had a 
long history of marginalization and were undesirable in U.S. society. However, the 
degree to which anti-miscegenation laws have inhibited Chinese marriages has rarely 
been examined. This essay focusses on the impact of the enactment of Chinese anti-
miscegenation laws and interracial marriages of Chinese citizens in 1880-1940.  
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A landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1 (1967) struck down all state laws banning interracial marriage (Pascoe, 2009) as 
“violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution” (Nowak & Rotunda, 2012). Not every state had 
an anti-miscegenation law, and the majority of states had already legalized interracial 
marriage prior to the Loving decision (Menchaca, 2008), which produced various 
outcomes and trends in marriage for Chinese immigrants and Chinese American 
citizens. A relatively large body of research has broadly examined trends and 
outcomes in interracial marriage since the 1970s (Qian, 1997; Fu, 2001; Qian & 
Lichter, 2007), and many qualitative designs (Hsu, 2000; Lee, 2003) provide a rich 
and nuanced understanding of the experiences of Chinese Americans but are less 
generalizable. Nevertheless, little quantitative research has directly examined the 
historical effects or outcomes of anti-miscegenation laws in different states and their 
impact on interracial marriage for Chinese people, based on the years when the laws 
were in effect. 
Existing research on the effects or outcomes of anti-miscegenation laws on 
interracial marriage has yielded mixed findings. Digging into the texts of the 
historical anti-miscegenation legislation, Sohoni (2007) showed that states used anti-
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miscegenation laws to restrict the marriage rights of U.S.-born Chinese and other 
Asians by linking them with their foreign-born co-ethnics. These laws justified the 
differential treatment of Chinese and other racial and ethnic immigrant groups. Using 
historical marriage licenses, Lo and Ng (2013) documented 76 Chinese-white 
marriages from 1886 to 1930 in Massachusetts, where the state anti-miscegenation 
law was abolished in 1843. They concluded that the Chinese American community in 
Massachusetts in the early to mid-20th century included many mixed marriages and 
families, and actually developed from a more heterogeneous community to a more 
homogeneous one after the abolishment of state anti-miscegenation law. When 
Chinese citizens are grouped with other Asians, drawing a 1% sample from the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) rather than monotonically 
increasing over time, one finds that the share of Asians intermarrying outside their 
ethnic group remains below 5% from 1880 to1940. After adjusting for relative supply 
and population share, Fryer (2007) concluded that the proclivity of Asians to marry 
outside their ethnicity increased significantly in the 20th century. But, this widely 
cited work ignores the causal impacts of twin historical components of marriages 
among Chinese in America: The Chinese exclusion laws, affecting the supply of 
Chinese women; and Chinese Anti-Miscegenation laws. 
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Conventional wisdom also suggests that higher educational attainment increases 
the probability of marrying outside one’s racial group. Studies show that compared to 
people with low educational attainment, people with high attainment have a higher 
likelihood of marrying partners of different races or religions (Qian, 1997; 
Kalmijn,1993 and 1998; Gullickson, 2006). Qian, Blair, and Ruf (2001) analyzed 
Asian-American interracial and interethnic marriage patterns from an education and 
country of origin perspective. Given the strong endogamy marriage preference among 
Asian Americans, only those who achieved socioeconomic success had a higher 
probability of intermarrying. However, achieving socioeconomic success does not 
guarantee a stable marital relationship. Bratter and King (2008) compared marriage 
cohorts and revealed that overall, interracial couples have a higher rate of divorce 
than same-race couples, particularly those marrying during the late 1980s.11 Later, 
using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Zhang and Hook 
(2009) found a similar, less stable pattern for interracial marriages. With regard to 
wages, using a 5% sample of the 2000 U.S. Census, Basu (2015) found a more 
 
11 Bratter and King’s (2008) study shows that along with some couple combinations by race and 
gender, white female/Asian male marriages were more likely to end in divorce. 
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negative wage premium for interracially married Asian women than for non-
interracially married Asian women. 
In addition, the study of the effects of anti-miscegenation laws on Chinese 
American intermarriages is complicated by the history of Chinese discrimination. The 
Page Act of 1875 started a series of Chinese Exclusion Acts that discriminated against 
all Chinese immigrants. The prevalent view of Chinese as "unassimilable" helped 
condone racial discrimination against Chinese citizens and added layers to the 
adversity they and their descendants faced in the U.S. (Chin, 1996). Although the 
Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943 (57 Stat. 600), as Erika Lee (2005) 
describes, it produced and reinforced a system of racial hierarchies, including 
immigrants and residents who were supposed to be exempt from the exclusionary 
laws. Moreover, the racial hierarchies produced economic inequality between Chinese 
Americans who married whites and those who married blacks 
This paper examines the impact of Chinese Anti-Miscegenation laws passed 
from the late 19th century to mid-20th century on the interracial married status of 
Chinese citizens in the U.S. My study improves on those of Fryer (2007) in several 
ways. First, rather than using a one percent sample, I employ individual-level full-
count censuses data from 1880 to 1940, including more than two hundred thousand 
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Chinese people aged above 20. Second, attempting to isolate the causal effect, I rely 
on the time variation in the state laws that prohibited Chinese intermarriage with 
whites and apply difference-in-difference (DID) methods. At the same time, I 
adequately address and use the clustered standard to study state-level policy changes 
when using individual-level data. Further, instead of taking the state enacted Chinese 
anti-miscegenation laws exogenously, I also use an instrumental variable strategy as 
one of the robustness checks.  
Contradicting the expectation that the passage of Chinese anti-miscegenation laws 
should decrease or eliminate Chinese interracial marriages, my results indicate that 
enactment of such laws had no significant effect on Chinese intermarried status. 
Moreover, unlike literature on black-white marriages, illustrating that they remained 
low after the repeal of anti-miscegenation laws (Porterfield, 1982; Johnson and 
Kreider, 2013; Rico et al., 2018), Chinese interracial marriages increased at high 
incidence once legitimized in the late 20th and 21st century. Thus, studying the 
historical laws shows how the increase of Asian-white interracial marriages emerged 
against a backdrop of prohibition of such marriages in the 19th century and the first 
half of the 20th century.  
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In the following sections, Section 2 provides a brief historical background of anti-
miscegenation laws and the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Section 3 describes data and 
methods. Section 4 provides empirical results and specification tests, and Section 5 
concludes the paper with possible explanations for the findings as well as future 
extensions of this research.  
 
3.2 Historical Context 
3.2.1 Anti-Miscegenation Laws and Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
While there were no federal anti-miscegenation laws in the United States, individual 
state laws, particularly in Southern states and Plains states, proscribed inter-racial 
marriage (American Civil Liberties Union).Figure 3.1 illustrates which states had 
anti-miscegenation laws. Only ten states never enacted anti-miscegenation laws: 
Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Eleven states passed anti-miscegenation laws but repealed 
them prior to 1887: Pennsylvania (1780), Massachusetts (1843), Iowa (1851), Kansas 
(1859), New Mexico (1866), Washington (1868), Illinois (1874), Rhode Island 
(1881), Maine (1883), Michigan (1883), and Ohio (1887). Kansas, New Mexico, and 
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Washington repealed their laws before achieving statehood.12 Fourteen more states 
rescinded their anti-miscegenation statutes between 1887 and 1967: California (1948), 
Oregon (1951), Montana (1953), North Dakota (1955), Colorado (1957), South 
Dakota (1957), Idaho (1959), Nevada (1959), Arizona (1962), Nebraska (1963), Utah 
(1963), Indiana (1965), Wyoming (1965), and Maryland (1967).  
[insert figure 3.1 here] 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia (1967) made anti-
miscegenation laws unconstitutional nationwide. At the time, sixteen states still had 
such statutes in effect, and it was not until 2000 that all sixteen states formally 
repealed their anti-miscegenation laws, despite not being enforceable or valid since 
1967. Six states legalized interracial marriage right after Loving v. Virginia: Virginia 
(1968), Florida (1969), Missouri (1969), Oklahoma (1969), Texas (1969), and West 
Virginia (1969). The remaining ten states amended their state constitutions to legalize 
interracial marriage: Georgia (1972), Louisiana (1972), Arkansas (1973), North 
Carolina (1972), Kentucky (1974), Tennessee (1978), Delaware (1986), Mississippi 
(1987), South Carolina (1998), and Alabama (2000). The last state to legalize 
interracial marriage was Alabama, when voters approved the Alabama Interracial 
 
12 Kansas gained its statehood in 1861, Washington in 1889, and New Mexico in 1912.  
 83 
Marriage Amendment (also known as 2000 Alabama Amendment 2) with 59.49% 
(Alabama.gov, 2000) of the vote. 
While every anti-miscegenation law prohibited interracial marriage between 
blacks and whites, not every law clarified whether interracial marriage with Chinese 
was unlawful. For the statutes that banned marriage with Chinese, the specific 
language in these statutes that referred to Chinese people varied from state to state. 
Table 3.1 lists the year each state enacted its first Chinese anti-miscegenation law and 
summarizes all the statutes that prohibited Chinese from marrying whites. Figure 3.2 
then illustrates all of the states that passed a Chinese anti-miscegenation law. Fifteen 
out of 41 states with anti-miscegenation laws prohibited Chinese or some subgroups 
of Asians from marrying whites; fourteen13 out of fifteen included Chinese in their 
intermarriage legislation.14  
[insert Table 3.1 here] 
[insert Figure 3.2 here] 
 
13 The statutes of Arizona, California, Mississippi, Missouri, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming all 
referred to "Mongolians." Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon first used “Chinese,” and later broadened theirs 
laws to “Mongolians." Virginia used the terms “colored” person or “people of color.” Montana and 
Nebraska specified both "Chinese" and "Japanese" persons. 
14 Maryland only banned intermarriage with Malays. 
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Even before it was admitted to the United States in 1864, Nevada enacted 
Asian anti-miscegenation laws in 1861. The “An Act to Prohibit Marriages and 
Cohabitation of Whites with Indians, Chinese, Mulattoes and Negroes, Assembly of 
the Territory of Nevada, 1861” marked the first American jurisdiction to specifically 
prohibit marriage between whites and Chinese. The Act states that 
If any white man or woman intermarry with any black person, mulatto, 
Indian, or Chinese, the parties to such marriage shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the territorial 
prison for a term not less than one year, nor more than two years. 
In 1864, the same year Nevada was admitted to the Union, the Idaho Territory 
prohibited intermarriage between whites and Indians,15 Chinese, and persons of 
African descent (Idaho Terr. Gen. Laws 1864). However, in 1887, it added a 
provision to its statutes recognizing interracial marriages performed in other 
territories, stipulating that “All marriages contracted without this Territory, which 
would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, in this 
Territory.” In addition, Martin (1980) reported that the Idaho legislature relaxed the 
 
15 Indian in this context denotes American Indian. 
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prohibition on intermarriage between whites and Mongolians. The state statute 
approved whites to marry Mongolians from 1887 to 1921.16  
A couple of months later in 1865, the Arizona Territory became the first 
American jurisdiction to pass an anti-miscegenation law that banned interracial 
marriage between whites and “Mongolians,” 25 years earlier than California. While 
California became the first western state to pass an anti-miscegenation law in 1850, it 
was not until 1880 that California prohibited whites from marrying Mongolians. The 
Amendments of Codes of California 1880 states that the issuance of marriage licenses 
to Caucasian and Chinese couples was prohibited. Later, the 1905 California Statues 
554 declared that “Mongolian” marriage with a white was void. Although the term 
“Mongolians” occasionally generated controversy over who was to be included in this 
group, marriage clerks and judges often interpreted “Mongolians” as encompassing 
both “Chinese” and “Japanese” (Kwon, 2011; Martin, 1980). It was not until the 
1920s that county clerks began to encounter marriage license applications for 
marriages between Filipinos and whites. Though the California courts forced the 
issuance of marriage licenses to some Filipino and white couples, in 1933, the statute 
 
16 Beginning in 1887, the Revised Statutes eliminated Indians and Chinese from the taboo categories.  
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was amended once again to include “members of the Malay race” (which included 
Filipinos) as part of those ineligible to marry whites (Volpp, 1999; Cal. Stat. 1933). 
Unlike the western states, the racial implication of Mississippi’s first anti-
miscegenation law (1822 Mississippi Code ch.102, sec.1) was unclear. It only 
indicates that marriages between whites are legally valid. Nevertheless, in 1865 after 
the Civil War ended, Mississippi passed the most severe penalty for intermarriage in 
American history, specifically, life imprisonment in the state penitentiary:  
…That it shall not be lawful for any freedman, free negro or mulatto to 
intermarry with any white person; nor for any white person to intermarry with 
any freedman, free negro or mulatto; and any person who shall so intermarry 
shall be deemed guilty of felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be confined 
in the State Penitentiary for life; ... 
Although the law was suspended during Reconstruction, it was reinstated in 
1880. Then, in the Code of 1892, Mississippi broadened the ban on whites 
intermarrying to include Mongolians.  
Montana passed its first anti-miscegenation law in 1909, much later than other 
states, to reinforce the taboo. Like other western states, the law primarily targeted 
marriages between whites and Chinese and Japanese. Of course, the law could not 
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omit the one-drop rule to ban white-black marriages. In the same year, South Dakota 
passed its first anti-miscegenation law. Different from Montana, South Dakota’s first 
law was enacted without mentioning Chinese. Later, in 1913, South Dakota repealed 
the 1909 statutes and put restrictions on marriages between whites and Chinese. 
In summary, forbidding whites to marry Chinese was never the central point 
of American anti-miscegenation laws, but after the Civil War and with the growth in 
Chinese immigrants, in the mid-19th century, almost one-third of the states placed 
Chinese into an excluded group. Four states (Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and Utah) 
passed Chinese anti-miscegenation statutes even before statehood. Since the laws 
were enacted in different states and in different years, these laws would affect 
interracial marriage rates for Chinese people across states and years. This interstate 
and intertemporal variability in the years Chinese anti-miscegenation laws were 
enacted allows for the performance of multi-period, differences-in-differences 
analyses on the marriage outcomes for Chinese people. 
3.2.2 The Page Act of 1875 
Introduced and sponsored by Horace F. Page, a California Republican congressman, 
the Page Act of 1875 (18 Stat. 477) was the first federal law to restrict immigration in 
the United States. It closed the borders to Chinese women entering the United States 
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(Abrams, 2005). The Page Act has two main elements: (1) it banned entry for any 
involuntary labor into the United States from China, Japan, or any Asian country, and 
(2) it placed a harsher ban on Chinese women. The act forbids contracts, agreements, 
and importation of women for prostitution: 
“… shall knowingly or willfully hold, or attempt to hold, any woman 
to such purposes, in pursuance of such illegal importation and contract or 
agreement, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, 
shall be imprisoned not exceeding five years and pay a fine not exceeding five 
thousand dollars”. 
Even though the Page Act aimed to exclude Chinese women who would engage in 
prostitution, it virtually barred and excluded all Chinese women from the United 
States during its implementation (Luibhéid, 2002) and considered Chinese women 
undesirable (Abrams, 2005). Therefore, Chinese immigrants were unable to create 
families with each other or across races and ethnic groups within the United States 
due to the formidable barriers. According to Peffer (1986) “… before they set foot on 
a China steamer, [the Page Act] must have helped to discourage them from ever 
attempting the journey and, in so doing, contributed to the process that made Chinese 
families forbidden institutions in a land that did not want them…”, which had a far-
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reaching influence on Chinese marriages even in states without anti-miscegenation 
laws and created massive numbers of Chinese bachelors who worked in the U.S. but 
had wives in China (Hsu, 2000).  
3.2.3 Chinese Exclusion Acts: The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, The Geary Act 
of 1892, and The Immigration Act of 1924 
As the first immigration law to exclude an entire ethnic group (Lee, 2003), 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (22 U.S. Stat. 60) started a series of laws passed in 
the United States to discriminate against Chinese immigrants, including but not 
limited to the Geary Act (27 Stat. 25), the Immigration Act of 1917 (39 Stat. 874), 
and the Immigration Act of 1924 (43 Stat. 153). The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) 
banned both "skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining." Later, 
the Geary Act (1892) required "Chinese already in the U.S. to possess 'certificates of 
residence' that served as proof that they entered the U.S. legally and had the right to 
remain in the country (Salyer, 1995)." Therefore, very few Chinese immigrants could 
enter the country after 1882.17 Even Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, a 
judge well known for his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), wrote:   
 
17 Diplomatic officials and other officers on business, along with their house servants, for the Chinese 
government were allowed entry as long as they had the proper certification verifying their credentials. 
Merchants, teachers, travelers, and students were exempted as well.  
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“[t]here is a race [Chinese] so different from our own that we do not permit 
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons 
belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our 
country. I allude to the Chinese race. But, by the statute in question, a 
Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the 
United States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of whom, 
perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the Union... and who have all 
the legal rights that belong to white citizens, are yet declared to be criminals, 
liable to imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by citizens of 
the white race.” 
Measuring the impacts of the passages of past laws econometrically is 
challenged by the small population of Chinese in the U.S., the fragmentary nature of 
marriage records, and the measurement of law outcomes. Luckily, the interstate and 
intertemporal variability of enactment of anti-miscegenation laws, the release of full 
counts of historical U.S. censuses, and linked spouse race in the census record offer 
some particular advantages in modeling and estimation of the policy impacts. The 
following section documents the details about the data and method used in this essay. 
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3.3 Data and Method  
My analyses are based on complete-count microdata from the 1880-1940 U.S. 
Censuses from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (hereafter, 1880-
1940 U.S. data). Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of the Chinese population 20 and 
over that was subject to Asian anti-miscegenation laws in all of the census years. In 
1880, 53.87% of the Chinese population lived in states that had enacted Asian anti-
miscegenation laws. The peak came in the 1920 census. Over half (60.23%) of the 
Chinese population lived in the states where they could not marry whites. By 1960, 
according to the last census before the Loving vs. Virginia case, 58.3% of Chinese 
were still subject to Asian anti-miscegenation laws. Starting with the 1880 census,18 a 
question on marital status was included and IPUMS adds an additional marital status 
category for “married, spouse absent,” which helped construct my analytical sample.  
[insert figure 3.3 here] 
Appending 1880-1940 U.S. data and the dates when Chinese anti-miscegenation 
laws were enacted, I constructed repeated cross-sectional data of Chinese and their 
 
18 J. David Hacker (1999) and Catherine A. Fitch (2005) used the surname, sex, age, and position in a 
household to create a “never married” variable for the 1850-1870 censuses. Given the small Chinese 
population prior to the1870 census, I did not construct the “never married” variable myself and focus 
instead on the 1880 and later censuses. 
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spouses. My primary dependent variable is an indicator of inter-racial married status, 
and the sample is restricted to adults at age of 20 and above. One non-trivial issue for 
Chinese in the historical census is that a large proportion of them were married but 
with a spouse not present in the household. This did not negatively affect my analysis 
of inter-racial married status, but I assumed that the individuals with an absent spouse 
were intramarried with a Chinese spouse for the intermarriage rate analysis.19 In 
addition, Hawaii and Alaska are excluded from the sample because even though there 
is a long history of Chinese and Chinese enclaves in Hawaii, Hawaii and Alaska 
achieved statehood much later than the main years of Chinese exclusion (1975-1943) 
and the years when anti-miscegenation laws (1691-1968) were most vigorously 
enacted and enforced. Therefore, every other state in the sample was a part of the 
Union from 1880 to 1940.  
I also include age, U.S.-born, ability to read and write, occupation, and a skewed 
sex ratio indicator if the county-level male-to-female sex ratio is greater than 5.20 To 
account for Chinese habitation within cities and ethnic enclaves, in particular, I 
 
19 There were 138,219 spouses absent in the household.  
20 The conventional skew sex ratio in the literature is 1.06 or 1.08. Given the context that early Chinese 
immigrants to the U.S. were predominantly male laborers, I use 10 as the threshold of the unbalanced 
sex ratios. 
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generated an indicator for Chinatown based on the historical records. Assembling 
information from different states’ historical societies, urban renewal projects 
websites, and Chinatown association websites, Table 3.2 presents a list of the 
historical U.S. Chinatowns. The very first Chinatowns formed during the gold rush 
years, followed by Chinatowns built in cities along Central Pacific and Union Pacific 
railroads (Kennedy et al., 2020). Unfortunately, most of these early Chinatowns have 
vanished except for those in big cities. Due both to riots against Chinese communities 
and the Chinese Exclusion Acts, Chinese residents were pushed out of California and 
migrated to northern and central states where they were offered jobs or safety (Li, 
2018; Pfaelzer, 2008). The growth, expansion, and decline of Chinatowns offers a 
unique variability that allows this analysis to reveal unobserved heterogeneity across 
states capturing the anti-Chinese sentiment. 
[insert Table 3.2 here] 
To investigate the effect of Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws on 
interracial marital status, I employed the standard difference-in-difference (DID) 
strategy that compares the inter-racial marital status of individuals who resided in 
states that had Chinese anti-miscegenation laws to that of individuals who lived in 
states that did not enact Chinese anti-miscegenation laws. The average sex ratio 
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across 1880-1940 censuses for Chinese is 10.26. Given the extremely unbalanced sex 
ratio among the Chinese in the United States prior to 1940, I performed the analysis 
separately for men and women. My main specification is:  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿⁡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1)⁡ 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is an indicator for individual i residing in state s and intermarried in census 
year t. My independent variable of interest is 𝛿⁡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡, an indicator to 1 if 
state s implemented an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law in census year t. It 
estimates the effect of Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws on the probability that 
a Chinese individual would be inter-married in state s at census year t.⁡𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector 
of characteristics that are suggested to influence the inter-married status discussed in 
the previous paragraphs. 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents the age of individual i residing in state s in 
census year t. 𝛼𝑠 and 𝛾𝑡  are state and census year fixed effects, respectively, and 𝑖𝑠𝑡 
is the conventional error term.  
Given the debate about the best way to correct serial correlation in DID 
models (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), equation (1) may have a potential problem 
estimating standard errors. The legislation (had a Chinese anti-miscegenation law) 
only varies at the state and year level, while I used individual-level data in my 
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analysis. The most widely used approach is to calculate standard errors clustered at 
one level higher than the level of problematic serial correlation, which, in my case, is 
the state level. This clustering allows for unrestricted serial correlation of an 
individual’s error term within state across time and is easily applied in most statistical 
software. Therefore, I also estimated equation (2): 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿⁡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2)⁡ 
The only difference between equations (1) and (2) is that equation (2) further 
decomposes the error term to 𝜇𝑠𝑡 ,⁡a state-year shock, and 𝑖𝑠𝑡, the conventional 
individual-state-year specific term. 𝑖𝑠𝑡 is assumed to be mean zero and serially 
uncorrelated. Some scenarios for 𝜇𝑠𝑡  are job shortages and anti-Chinese riots or 
violence in a state. These events are likely to be correlated across years within the 
state. Meanwhile, not properly correcting the standard errors leads to a standard error 
that is too small.  
 To capture the time series patterns across censuses, following Fryer (2007), I 
assumed that between 1880 and 1940, race was the most important attribute in the 
American marriage market for all racial groups. This assumption is plausible given 
the Chinese anti-miscegenation laws, and the series of Chinese Exclusion Acts. 
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Interracial marriage with Chinese during this time was illegal in fourteen states and 
possessed enormous social costs to non-Chinese spouses (Teng, 2013). Even in states 
without bans on interracial marriage with Chinese, marriages across racial lines were 
rare. Figure 3.4 presents the share of Chinese inter-racial marriages in the period with 
enactment of Chinese anti-miscegenation laws (1880-1940) vs. Chinese inter-racial 
marriages in the 21st century. The share of Chinese interracial marriages remained 
very low in the years with enacted Chinese anti-miscegenation laws, including states 
that never passed Chinese anti-miscegenation laws. In stark contrast, after the year of 
2000, the share of interracial marriages grew more than five times for the states that 
never enacted Chinese anti-miscegenation laws and increased fifteen times for the 
states that passed Chinese anti-miscegenation laws. This descriptive evidence 
counters the "long arch of history" view that claims long-lasting and lingering effects 
of past racist policies. 




3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 present the share of interracially married persons in each 
census by age for Chinese men and women, respectively. In general, the proportion of 
intermarried Chinese men and women is lower than 5%. Moreover, Chinese men have 
a higher share of interracial marriage than do Chinese women in each age group and 
census. This pattern is comparable to Fryer’s findings (2007) about Asian 
intermarriage. Historical events such as gold mining, transcontinental railroad 
construction, and the Page Act of 1875, produced massive gender imbalances in the 
Chinese community. It is not difficult to envision that a higher proportion of Chinese 
men had to marry outside their ethnicity or be left in an enormous unmarried or never 
married community of single Chinese men.21 
[insert figure 3.5 and figure 3.6 here] 
Though Figures 3.5 and 3.6 shed light on a positive relationship between an 
unbalanced sex ratio and the probability of interracial marriage, they do not reveal the 
differences between states that enacted laws vs. states that did not. Figures 3.7 and 
 
21 Appendix Figure 2A and Figure 2B present the percentage of ever married men in each census by 
birth-cohort for Chinese men and women. By the age of 50, 76% of Chinese males were ever-married, 
while the number was 95% for women. 
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3.8 display the proportion of Chinese men and Chinese women who intermarried in 
states that passed Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws and those that did not. 
States that never prohibited Chinese interracial marriages always had a higher share 
of residents that married outside the Chinese community. Meanwhile, men present a 
more stable trend than do women across census years. Table 3.3 shows the 
characteristics for individuals aged 20 and over in states that did and did not enact 
Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws, which are the individuals in the treatment and 
control groups. Women who resided in states with Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation 
laws were on average 36 years old and slightly younger than women who lived in 
states without Chinese anti-miscegenation laws. Almost 40% of women in treated 
states could not read, and write and only 34% were born in the U.S. Meanwhile, more 
women in the comparison group were able to read and write and were born in the U.S. 
Moreover, 65% of women in the treated states lived in a city with a Chinatown, and 
54% of female residents who lived in states that banned Chinese interracial marriages 
had more skewed sex ratios. In sum, women who resided in states that had 
Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws had a greater ability to marry Chinese men, 
given the relatively high availability of potential Chinese partners.  
[insert figure 3.7 and figure 3.8 here] 
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[insert Table 3.3 here] 
On the other hand, men who resided in states with Chinese anti-miscegenation 
laws were on average 46 years old and much older than women who lived in the same 
states. Twenty percent of men were illiterate in treated states, while the number for 
comparison states is 22%. Unlike Chinese women, a smaller proportion of Chinese 
men were native-born. Ten percent of male residents in states that prohibited Chinese 
interracial marriages were born in the U.S., and the proportion for states that did not 
ban Chinese interracial marriages is 19%. Furthermore, 46% of men lived in a city 
with a Chinese ethnic enclave in states with Chinese anti-miscegenation laws. 
In addition, Table 3.4 displays the association between the states that never 
passed an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law and the inter-racial marriage 
outcomes for all Chinese men and women at age of 20 and above. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable indicator for the interracial married status in a specific 
census year. The Linear Probability Model (LPM) coefficients show that the passage 
of an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law negatively associates with the probability 
that a Chinese man entered an interracial marriage by 4 percentage points. These 
effects are statistically significant for robust and state-clustered standard errors at least 
at a 5% significance level. In contrast, the passage of an Asian/Chinese anti-
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miscegenation law does not have a statistically significant association with women’s 
interracial married status after applying the state-cluster standard error (column (10) – 
column (12)). The insignificant results are not surprising given the small population 
of Chinese women in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, looking more 
closely at the positive coefficients for women and considering their spouses’ racial 
heritage for all intermarried Chinese women (Appendix Table 1), white males are the 
dominant choice for Chinese women in interracial marriages. Given the historical 
racial hierarchy and racial inequity in the U.S., this may point to disparate treatment 
depending on whether a Chinese person chose to intermarry with a white or non-white 
person. 
[insert Table 3.4 here] 
However, without direct evidence on the counterfactual trend for the states 
that had Chinese anti-miscegenation laws, the LPM coefficients could be biased. The 
LPM coefficient could absorb the trends without law enforcement, such as within 
time changes to interracial marriages. Thus, the LPM estimates represent trend 
changes of Chinese interracial marriage plus the treatment effect of introducing a 
Chinese anti-miscegenation law. To avoid the bias from the simple LPM, I apply a 
 101 
differences-in-differences estimator and use the trends for states that never enacted a 
Chinese anti-miscegenation law as the counterfactual outcome.  
3.4.2 Main Specification  
My main estimates are in Table 3.5. It includes all the individuals at age of 20 and 
above and separates males and females. The dependent variable is the same as table 
3.4, a dummy variable indicator for interracial married status in a specific census 
year. Columns (1) – (3) are the estimates of equation (1) controlling only for age; 
controlling for age, supply in the marriage market; and controlling for age, marriage 
supply, and occupation scores, respectively. Surprisingly, the passage of an 
Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law increases the probability that a Chinses man 
entered an interracial marriage by around 0.7 percentage points. These effects are 
small but statistically significant for heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. As 
stated in the prior section, the Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws varied at the 
state level, whereas the unit of observation is the individual level. Thus, to properly 
address correlation within a state, I applied the state clustered standard errors to the 
estimator. Clustering increases the standard errors of states that enacted 
Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws, yielding a statistically insignificant law 
passage effect for men. In addition, the passage of an Asian/ Chinese anti-
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miscegenation law has no statistically significant effect on women’s interracial 
married status with and without the state cluster standard error (column (7) – column 
(12)).  
[insert Table 3.5 here] 
Furthermore, other social and demographic controls in the specifications agree 
with the literature. In agreement with the literature on hostility toward Chinese people 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, an ethnic enclave, namely a Chinatown, gave 
the Chinese an avenue for a social life and was an important place to meet potential 
Chinese spouses, decreasing the probability of interracial marriage. The Chinatown 
effect is greater for women than for men. Meanwhile, being born in the U.S. and 
literate could expand one’s social network in ways that increased the probability of 
interracial marriage.  
3.4.3 Testing the Robustness of Main Specification  
The main results indicate that implementing an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law 
had no statistically significant effect on both Chinese men’s and women’s incidence 
of interracial marriage. These findings contradict the expected legislation effect. 
Therefore, I conducted the following analysis to check the robustness of the results. 
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Due to the small population size of Chinese females, the robustness analyses were 
only applied to Chinese males.  
 First, I defined the comparison group as narrower than the main specification. 
As noted in the historical context, some states never enacted anti-miscegenation laws, 
and some repealed their laws before 1887. Accordingly, my narrow definition of the 
comparison group only includes states that still had anti-miscegenation laws in 1887 
but did not explicitly exclude Chinese people from marrying whites (15 states). The 
differences between the treatment group and the more restrictive comparison group 
can be interpreted as the lower bound of the legislation effect. I present the results in 
Table 3.6. It compares states that completely banned interracial marriage with the 
Chinese and states that did not explicitly include Chinese people in their laws. 
Consistent with the main specification, columns (1) – (3) adopt heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, and columns (4) – (6) cluster standard errors on the state. Like 
the main specification, the enactment of an Asian/Chines anti-miscegenation law had 
no significant impact on Chinese male interracial marriage once applied the clustered 
stand errors. 
[insert Table 3.6 here] 
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 Second, I applied the event history analysis method (see, for example, 
MacKinlay, 1997; Heckman and Hotz, 1989) to test whether the parallel assumption 
holds. The event history analysis requires all of the year coefficients before the 
program—in this case, the enactment of Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws—to 
be statistically insignificant to exclude the anticipatory effect of the legislation. That 
is to say, if the passage of Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws impacted Chinese 
interracial marriage, we should not observe a significant correlation between the laws 
and Chinese interracial marriage before the laws were passed. Accordingly, I define 
the event window as the first census year after a specific state passed its first 
Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law and constructed a pre- and post-event window 




𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝐼[𝑡0−𝑙] +∑δ𝑘
5
𝑘=0
𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝐻𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝐼[𝑡0+𝑘] + 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡 ⁡(3)  
Specifically, 𝐼[𝑡0−𝑙] denotes to the census year l before the 𝑡
0, the first census 
year that states passed an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law.⁡𝐼[𝑡0+𝑘] represents the 
census year k after the 𝑡0. δ−𝑙 should not be statistically significant if the parallel 
trends assumption holds, and we do not observe the anticipatory effect of the law 
before it is passed. Figure 3.9 plots the coefficient estimations and confidence 
intervals of the event dummy variables from specifications with and without 
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covariates. All estimates account for the year and state fixed effects. As figure 3.9 
significance tests are over 0.1 (Appendix Table 3.2), suggesting statistically 
insignificant “pre-program” effects and little evidence of different pre-trends in states 
that did and did not pass Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws. Although the years 
after passage do not check the parallel trend assumption, they help to explain why the 
coefficient for Chinese males in table 3.5 is positively small. The coefficients on the 
periods after passage vary, and at the fifth period after passage, the coefficients are 
close to zero (-0.0003) and above zero (0.0006) when controlling for other covariates. 
Rather, the positive and larger coefficient from the third period prior to passage drew 
my attention. One legitimate question to ask is why some states passed laws targeting 
Chinese intermarriage and other states did not. Next, I examine the potential 
endogeneity of the passage of an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law.  
[insert Figure 3.9 here] 
Assuming the enactment of an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law is 
exogenous, the differences-in-differences estimator does not exclude a potential 
endogenous relationship between a law and interracial marriages. Rooted in racist 
thinking that Chinese immigrants could not assimilate, Chinese men were first 
brought to the U.S. to labor but not to stay (Moran, 2003). Exacerbated by the Page 
Act of 1875, the United States government made it nearly impossible for Chinese 
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women to put down roots, form families, and produce children who would be 
American by birth (Moran, 2003). Meanwhile, the entire U.S. population faced 
divergent sex ratios as a whole group (Mullen, 2011; IPUMS-HGIS, 2011). Counties 
in western states experienced higher male-to-female sex ratios than those on the east 
coast and in some central states. Relating an imbalanced white sex ratio to marriage 
means there is a shortage of white women but a surplus of white men. Among all the 
policies to increase the number of marriageable women, the prohibition of interracial 
marriages could be the most feasible. Thus, the passage of an Asian/Chinese anti-
miscegenation law could be endogenous. To test the exogeneity of the legislation 
effect, I applied the by-county-age white-male-to-white-female sex ratio to the 
passage of an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law and present the results in Table 
3.7. Columns (1) and (2) report the results using the restricted comparison group as 
mentioned earlier, and Columns (3) and (4) report the results using the full 
comparison group. After taking into account the possible endogenous relationship 
between the passage of an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law and Chinese 
intermarried status, the enactment of a law decreases Chinese males’ probability of 
intermarriage by 1 percentage point and the effect is statistically significant at the 
10% level. Rather than use the average treatment effect, it is important to know that 
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the instrumental approach produces a local average treatment effect (LATE). It is the 
effect only for Chinese men whose interracial marriage decisions were affected by the 
passage of a law. 
[Insert Table 3.7 here] 
Last, I examined the legislation's impact on birth cohorts between 1876 and 
1905. Although, as a snapshot, censuses do not track people over time, to understand 
if the average legislation effect differs in its impact on some cohorts, I restricted the 
following analysis to people born between 1876 and 1905. Inspired by Hacker (1999) 
and Fitch (2005), I constructed synthetic birth cohorts. People included in a synthetic 
cohort are from different censuses but are all treated as though they are in the same 
birth cohort.22 I constructed the 1876-1885, 1886-1895, and 1896-1905 synthetic 
cohorts and present the results in Table 3.8. In addition to the covariates in equation 
(1), a series of dummy indicators for the synthetic cohorts are included as controls. 
With the clustered-state standard errors (column (4) - column (6)), there is no 
statistically significant impact from enacting a law on the probability of being 
 
22 Helgertz et al. (2020) introduced a new strategy to link historical U.S. censuses. However, as noted 
in their working paper, the link for Asians is not as accurate as the link is for whites and blacks. To 
avoid unnecessary mismatches for individuals, I adopted the synthetic cohort method to perform the 
robustness check of the legislation impact. 
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intermarried. However, the ones without clustered-state standard errors (column (1)- 
column (3)), are negative and statistically significant. The average age of individuals 
in the synthetic cohorts was around 35, and the censuses covered them from 5 to 64, 
which is a complete life span to estimate marital status. They represent the “peak” 
impact period of the Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation laws on intermarried status.  
[insert Table 3.8 here] 
In sum, contrary to the expected legislation effect of prohibiting interracial 
marriages for Asians/Chinese, the enactment of an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation 
law had no statistically significant effect on the incidence of interracial marriage for 
both Chinese men and women at age 20 and above. This finding is robust for a 
restricted comparison group, event history analysis, and synthetic cohort analysis. 
Exploring the possible selection on the passage of an Asian/Chinese anti-
miscegenation law, the local average treatment effect returns negative effects, but 
only applies to the compliers. 
 
3.5 Conclusions and Discussion 
Policy analysts and demographers have developed a deeper understanding of marriage 
transitions and trends in the post-civil rights era and post-Loving v. Virginia. 
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Evaluating the impact of past laws on a small population, however, has been difficult. 
Restricted by the measurement of the small population, researchers have difficulties 
capturing most of the individuals in a small population and teasing out the effects of 
policies. Powered by the availability of the full count censuses, my study is able to 
answer the policy question: what was the effect of Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation 
laws on Chinese interracial married status? While unlikely to directly inform the 
marriage patterns or family formation of Chinese Americans today, given the anti-
miscegenation laws and Chinese exclusion acts were national repealed more than fifty 
years, my results indicate no statistically significant impact from Asian/Chinese anti-
miscegenation legislation on the Chinese interracial married status. 
 My estimates emphasize the importance of properly applying cluster standard 
errors when using individual-level data to study state-level policy. Clustered standard 
errors allow for unrestricted serial correlation of the error terms of individuals within 
states across years (Abadie et al., 2017). As shown in my estimates, clustering 
increases the standard error of the coefficient on Chinese anti-miscegenation laws in 
all models, thus rendering the statistical insignificance of the impact of the law. The 
difference between the conventional and clustered standard errors on the other side 
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demonstrates the likely presence of serial correlation among individuals within states 
across years. 
Despite assuming passage of an Asian/Chinese anti-miscegenation law as an 
external shock, a state that passed a law also faced a surplus of men. The animosity and 
sexual anxieties about Chinese men marrying white women (Leung, 2014), incarnated 
as “Yellow Peril” (Tchen and Yeats, 2014), was seen as a danger to society. Besides, as 
regulated by the Expatriation Act of 1907, American women who married Chinese men 
would lose their American citizenship. The severe consequences of interracial marriage 
to Chinese males could lead one to conclude that white women did not marry Chinese 
men even if they wanted to.  
In contrast, white men were not targeted by the Expatriation Act of 1907. To 
solve the shortage of marriageable women, a white men could marry a Chinese woman 
and migrate to states that did not ban Chinese interracial marriages, as documented by 
Wallenstein (1994). Even Richard and Mildred Loving (Loving v. Virginia (1967)) pled 
guilty and were sentenced to one year in jail, but the sentence would be commuted for 
twenty-five years, so long as the couple did not return to Virginia together during that 
period (Richter, 2015). In my future research, more detailed coding and classification of 
anti-miscegenation laws is needed, such as which states did not recognize Chinese 
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interracial marriages performed in other states, and if any state also prohibited Chinese 
interracial marriage to non-whites (Loewen, 1988). Unfortunately, the historical census 
only provides marital status but not marital year. Without knowing the specific 
marital year, my estimates could be biased either way. As mentioned, if an 
intermarried Chinese moved to a different state because of his/her marital status, it 
underestimates the legislation effect.  
According to the literature on immigrant assimilation, first-, second- and third-
generation Americans are impacted differently by legislation (Borjas1985; Zhou, 
1997). First- and second-generation Americans are most likely to be affected by anti-
miscegenation laws based on evidence from different processes and consequences of 
assimilation (Xie and Greenman, 2011) or segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou, 
1993). My current estimates only contain one covariate on nativity: whether born in 
the U.S. In my future research, I will perform separate analyses for first-, second- and 
third-generation Americans. In addition, considering the new method that stresses 
variation in treatment timing (Goodman-Bacon, 2021), I will adopt the difference-in-
difference decomposition method to include time-varying controls in the next step. 
The proposed method will help illustrate heterogeneous effects from different 
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enactment years of Chinese anti-miscegenation laws differ from simply summarizing 
the average treatment effects across states.   
The null hypothesis, which I support—that the passage of Chinese anti-
miscegenation laws had no impact on Chinese interracial marriages—suggests several 
possible conclusions about the history of Chinese anti-miscegenation law in the 19th 
and 20th centuries and policy implications for the 21st century. First, though neither 
were statistically significant in interracial marriage with the Chinese anti-
miscegenation laws, Chinese men and women differed greatly in the incidence of 
marrying, given the extremely high Chinese sex ratio in the 19th century and first part 
of the 20th century in the U.S. The states that passed Chinese anti-miscegenation laws 
were also the states that had a surplus of white men. Possibly, white men who married 
Chinese women may have been charged with a misdemeanor crime and may have 
been arrested but they were not convicted, once again exposing the U.S.’s differential 
racial enforcement. Therefore, further historical and documented studies are needed to 
establish which impacts were observed. 
Second, the evidence from my estimates also establishes the historical 
backdrop of the high incidence of Asian-white marriage in the 21st century. Because 
it had been banned for more than one hundred years, once it was legitimized and the 
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Chinese Exclusion Acts repealed, Asian-white interracial marriages occurred more 
frequently. The current policies have stronger effects than the lingering impacts of 
historic policies. My causal study of historical laws indicates the importance of how 
properly studying historical policy can aid in the understanding of current trends. 
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Figure 3. 2: U.S. States that Passed Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws  
 













Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
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Figure 3. 4: Share of Chinese Interracial Marriages in States that Did Enact vs. 
States that Did Not Enact Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
 
 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
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Figure 3. 5: Share of Chinese Men in Interracial Marriages by Age and Census 
 
 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
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Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
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Figure 3. 7: Share of Interracial Married Chinese Men in States That Did Enact 




Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 







Figure 3. 8: Share of Interracial Married Chinese Women in States That Did 
Enact vs. States That Did Not Enact Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
 
 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 






Figure 3. 9: Event Study of the Effect of Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws on 
Chinese Men Interracial Marriages 
 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 








Table 3 1: Year Each State Enacted and Repealed Its First Asian Anti-Miscegenation Law 
State 
Admission 







Repealed Races banned from marrying whites 
Nevada 1864 1861 1861 
Y 
1959 
Blacks, Native Americans, Asians, 
Filipinos 
Idaho 1890 1864 1864 Y 1959 Blacks, Native Americans, Mongolians 
Arizona 1912 1865 1865 Y 1962 Blacks, Native Americans, Asians 
Oregon 1859 1862 1866 
 
1951 
Blacks, Native Americans, Asians, 
Native Hawaiians 
California 1850 1850 1880  1948 Blacks, Asians 
Utah 1896 1852 1888 Y 1963 Blacks, Mongolians, Filipinos (Malays) 
Mississippi 1817 1822 1892  1987 Blacks, Mongolians 
Missouri 1821 1835 1909  1969 Blacks, Mongolians 
Montana 1889 1909 1909  1953 Blacks, Chinese, Japanese 
Nebraska 1867 1855 1913  1963 Blacks, Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos 
South Dakota 1889 1909 1913  1957 Blacks, Asians 
Wyoming 1890 1869 1913  1965 Blacks, Mongolians, Filipinos (Malays) 
Virginia 1788 1691 1924  1968 All non-whites (colored) 
Georgia 1788 1750 1927  1972 Blacks, Native Americans, Asians 
Maryland 1788 1692 1935  1967 Blacks, Malays 
Note: States are ordered by date first Asian anti-miscegenation law enacted. 
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Almy, WY 1870 1927 Pittsburgh, PA 1900 1950 
Baltimore, MD 1880 1920 Portland, ME 1890 1960 
Big Timber, MT 1880 1930 Portland, OR 1850 / 
Boston, MA 1875 / Providence, RI 1890 1951 
Butte, MT 1868 1940 Reno, NV 1855 1878 
Cedar Creek, MT 1870 / Rock Springs, WY 1870 1927 
Chicago, IL 1880 / Sacramento, CA 1850 1915 
Cleveland, OH 1920 / Saint Louis, MO 1869 1966 
Deadwood, SD 1860 / Salem, OR 1870 / 
Denver, CO 1870 1940 Salinas, CA 1868 / 
Detroit, MI 1917 2000 Salt Lake City, UT 1860 1952 
Eureka, CA 1880 / Ventura, CA 1866 1923 
Evanston, WY 1870 1927 San Diego, CA 1870 / 
Fresno, CA 1872 / San Francisco, CA 1848 / 
Helena, MT 1880 1970 San Jose, CA 1866 1931 
Honolulu, HI 
 
/ Santa Rosa, CA 1910 / 
Houston, TX 1930 / Seattle, WA 1880 1930 
Los Angeles, CA 1880 / Spokane, WA 1883 1940 
New Orleans, LA 1860 1937 Stockton, CA 1850 1950 
New York, NY 1870 / Tacoma, WA 1880 1900 
Newark, NJ 1875 1950 Tucson, AZ 1880 1960 
Oakland, CA 1848 1940 Vallejo, CA 1880 / 
Oklahoma City, OK 1900 1920 Walla Walla, WA 1880 1962 
Omaha, NE 1860 1950 Washington, DC 1880 / 
Philadelphia, PA 1870 / 







Table 3 3: Descriptive Statistics for Chinese Lived in States That Did Enact vs. 
States That Did Not Enact Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
 Enacted Asian/China Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
 Chinese Females Chinese Males 
 Mean SD. N Mean SD. N 
Age 35.97 10.9 18,157 46.02 11.85 171,414  
Illiteracy 0.39 0.49 18,157 0.2 0.4 171,414  
US Born 0.34 0.47 18,157 0.1 0.3 171,414  
Chinatown in City 0.65 0.48 18,157 0.46 0.5 171,414  
Occupation score  
(highest 80) 3.58 8.81 18,157 17.56 12.2 171,414  
Skewed sex ratio  
(=1, if sex ratio>=10) 0.54 0.5 18,019 0.84 0.37 170,029 
       
 Did Not Enact Asian/China Anti-Miscegenation Laws 
 Chinese Females Chinese Males 
 Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Age 36.44 11.18 8,434  44.8 10.58 70,049  
Illiteracy 0.2 0.4 8,434  0.22 0.42 70,049  
US Born 0.55 0.5 8,434  0.19 0.39 70,049  
Chinatown in City 0.53 0.5 8,434  0.58 0.49 70,049  
Occupation score  
(highest 80) 3.02 7.96 8,434  18.02 13.24 70,049  
Skewed sex ratio  
(=1, if sex ratio>=10) 0.47 0.5 8,208  0.86 0.35 69,045  
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 








Table 3 4: Linear Probability Model Estimates of Enactment of Chinese Anti-
Miscegenation Laws on Chinese Interracial Married Status  
  Chinese Male 
 No Clustering Clustering 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Passed Chinese Anti 
-Miscegenation Law -0.0402*** -0.0404*** -0.0413*** -0.0402** -0.0404** -0.0413** 
 (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0201) (0.0205) (0.0205) 
Chinatown in city  -0.0016 -0.0021**  -0.0016*** -0.0021*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0009)  (0.0005) (0.0005) 
US born  0.0130*** 0.0127***  0.0130*** 0.0127*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0040)  (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Illiteracy  -0.0054** -0.0050**  -0.0054*** -0.0050*** 
  (0.0026) (0.0023)  (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Skewed Sex Ratio  0.0019 0.0025  0.0019 0.0025 
  (0.0016) (0.0016)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Age control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation control No No Yes No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 241,463 239,074 239,074 241,463 239,074 239,074 
 Chinese Female 
 No Clustering Clustering 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Passed Chinese Anti 
-Miscegenation Law 0.0244*** 0.0324*** 0.0322*** 0.0244 0.0324 0.0322 
 (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0227) (0.0238) (0.0238) 
Chinatown in city  -0.0074*** -0.0075***  -0.0074*** -0.0075*** 
  (0.0019) (0.0019)  (0.0018) (0.0018) 
US born  0.0116*** 0.0117***  0.0116*** 0.0117*** 
  (0.0035) (0.0035)  (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Illiteracy  -0.0039*** -0.0040***  -0.0039*** -0.0040*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0014)  (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Skewed Sex Ratio  -0.0003 -0.0003  -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0030) (0.0030)  (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Age control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation control No No Yes No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,591 26,227 26,227 26,591 26,227 26,227 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
Notes: Table 3.4 includes Chinese aged 20 and over. 
            Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3 5: Diff-in-Diff Estimates of Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws on 
Chinese Interracial Married Status 
  Chinese Male 
 No Clustering  Clustering 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Chinese Anti -
Miscegenation Law 0.0069*** 0.0066*** 0.0069***  0.0069 0.0066 0.0069 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)  (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Chinatown in city  -0.0014*** -0.0019***   -0.0014 -0.0019* 
  (0.0005) (0.0005)   (0.0011) (0.0010) 
US born  0.0130*** 0.0127***   0.0130*** 0.0127*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010)   (0.0043) (0.0040) 
Illiteracy  -0.0054*** -0.0050***   -0.0054** -0.0050** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004)   (0.0026) (0.0023) 
Skewed Sex Ratio  0.0024*** 0.0029***   0.0024 0.0029 
  (0.0007) (0.0007)   (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Age control Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation control No No Yes  No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 241,463 239,074 239,074  241,463 239,074 239,074 
 Chinese Female 
 No Clustering  Clustering 
 (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 
Chinese Anti -
Miscegenation Law 0.0009 -0.0044 -0.0042  0.0009 -0.0044 -0.0042 
 (0.0064) (0.0058) (0.0058)  (0.0069) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
Chinatown in city  -0.0075*** -0.0076***   -0.0075*** -0.0076*** 
  (0.0018) (0.0018)   (0.0018) (0.0019) 
US born  0.0116*** 0.0117***   0.0116*** 0.0117*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0017)   (0.0035) (0.0036) 
Illiteracy  -0.0038*** -0.0039***   -0.0038*** -0.0039*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0013)   (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Skewed Sex Ratio  -0.0005 -0.0005   -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (0.0024) (0.0024)   (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Age control Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation control No No Yes  No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,591 26,227 26,227   26,591 26,227 26,227 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
Notes: Table 3.5 includes Chinese aged 20 and over. 







Table 3 6: The Impact of Enactment of Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws on 
Chinese Men Interracial Married Status, Restricted Comparison Group 
 No Clustering  Clustering 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Chinese Anti -
Miscegenation Law 0.0026** 0.0021 0.0020  0.0026 0.0021 0.0020 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)  (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Chinatown in city  -0.0021*** -0.0022***   -0.0021*** -0.0022*** 
  -0.0004 (0.0004)   (0.0007) (0.0007) 
US born  0.0074*** 0.0074***   0.0074*** 0.0074*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010)   (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Illiteracy  -0.0017*** -0.0016***   -0.0017*** -0.0016*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004)   (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Skewed Sex Ratio  0.0002 0.0004   0.0002 0.0004 
  (0.0007) (0.0007)   (0.0010) (0.0011) 
        
Age control Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation control No No Yes  No No Yes 
        
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 180,235 178,642 178,642   180,235 178,642 178,642 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
Notes: Table 3.6 includes Chinese men aged 20 and over. 
















Table 3 7: Two-Stage Least Square Estimates of the Impact of Enactment of 
Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws on Chinese Men Interracial Married Status 
  Restricted Comparison Group  Broad Comparison Group 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Asian/Chinese Anti 
-Miscegenation Law  -0.0106* 
 
 -0.0141* 
  (0.0059) 
  (0.0084) 
White male to 
female sex ratio  0.0299***  
 
0.0290***  
 (0.0054)  
 (0.0059)  
Instrument F-
statistic 30.44  
 
24.19  
Age control Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Occupation control Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 178,642 178,642  239,037 239,037 
R2-adjusted 0.0307  
 0.0274  
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
Notes: Table 3.7 includes Chinese men aged 20 and over. 
           Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3 8: The Impact of Enactment of Chinese Anti-Miscegenation Laws on 
Chinese Men Interracial Married Status, Synthetic Cohorts 
 No Clustering  Clustering 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Chinese Anti -
Miscegenation Law -0.0184*** 
-
0.0209*** -0.0220***  -0.0184 -0.0209 -0.0220 
 (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0068)  (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0141) 
Chinatown in city  -0.0005 -0.0015   -0.0005 -0.0015 
  (0.0009) (0.0009)   (0.0024) (0.0024) 
US born  0.0143*** 0.0141***   0.0143*** 0.0141*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0012)   (0.0051) (0.0048) 
Illiteracy  
-
0.0127*** -0.0118***   -0.0127*** 
-
0.0118*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0009)   (0.0043) (0.0040) 
Skewed Sex Ratio  0.0054*** 0.0059***   0.0054** 0.0059** 
  (0.0013) (0.0013)   (0.0026) (0.0027) 
        
Age control Yes Yes Yes  
Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation control No No Yes  
No No Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  
Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Synthetic cohort fix 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 103,135 101,819 101,819  103,135 101,819 101,819 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
Notes: Table 3.8 includes Chinese men born between 1865 and 1905. 
           Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Synthesis and Conclusions 
This dissertation has explored and examined the structural factors affecting marriage 
outcomes in China and Chinese Americans in the United States. My three empirical 
studies indicate that laws and public policies impact deviations from family formation 
traditions and norms and produce inequalities. Specifically:   
1) Expected to create greater unity within the Chinese economy, Han-Ethnic 
Minzu intermarriage is commonly conceptualized as ethnic Minzu people marrying-
up with Han to improve socioeconomic status. My results, however, do not support 
the marry-up belief in terms of incomes, since ethnic Minzu people do not statistically 
gain economic benefit from intermarrying Han. Furthermore, Han-Ethnic Minzu 
intermarriages are not evenly distributed across educational achievement in Western 
China. Therefore, if the Han-Ethnic Minzu intermarriage can harmonize the 
relationship between Han and Minzu, policymakers would focus on the persons at the 
lower end of educational distribution.  
2) Complicated by the remnant of the one-child policy and the male 
preference in China, the skewed male-to-female sex ratio puzzles the emergence of 
female headship in China. Stressing the economic desirability or attractiveness of 
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men, my measure of the male supply in the marriage market only includes unmarried 
and employed men. After controlling for the economic attractiveness of unmarried 
men, my estimates suggest differing links between marriageable males and the 
prevalence of female-headed households between majority Han and ethnic Minzu 
women. Ethnic Minzu women are negatively disparately impacted by the supply of 
males with economic desirability for family formation in China.  
In addition, after the 21st century, an increasing number of men in rural China 
had arranged marriages and there was some bride trafficking from Southeast and 
South Asia. Meanwhile, domestically, China is experiencing an upward trend of 
female family headship. One critical piece of the two-sided puzzle is the economic 
ability of unmarried men. To improve the economic ability of unmarried men, 
policymakers have come up with different pathways and targeted programs for Han 
and ethnic Minzu to provide employment opportunities and increase job availability.  
3) Designed to maintain racial purity and preclude interracial marriage with 
whites, fourteen out of forty-one U.S. anti-miscegenation laws forbade Chinese 
citizens to marry whites. At the same time, a series of Chinese exclusion acts 
discriminated against Chinese immigrants in terms of coming and starting a family in 
the United States. Remaining at a low level and below 5% for of all marriages until 
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the 1940s, my estimates, however, do not show a statistical impact of anti-
miscegenation laws on Chinese interracial marital status. In contrast to the interracial 
marriage trends with the enactment of Chinese anti-miscegenation laws, after the 
national repeal of anti-miscegenation laws in 1968 and up until today, the number of 
Asian/Chinese intermarriages has sharply increased.  
Studying the historical legislative effects provides the backdrop for the 
upsurge of Asian/Chinese intermarriages in the late 20th century. The legitimization 
of interracial marriage between Chinese and white citizens encouraged and 
incentivized people to seek this kind of intimate relationship. Though Chinese-white 
interracial marriage might be expected to remain at low level, given the more than 
one-hundred-year history of prohibition, the current policies have stronger effects 
than the fading residual impacts of historical policies. 
 Addressing how systematic factors affect family structures and marriage 
norms and result in inequalities, this dissertation offers new evidence and insights into 
how the most intimate personal relation, marriage, is policy relevant. Reflecting 
historical laws targeting Chinese Americans in the United States and recent family 
planning policy and marriage law in China, the results of this study expand the 
understanding of circumstances for ethnic minorities in the marriage market. The 
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proposed policy implications promote using family structure as a key factor in 
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Appendix  
Appendix Table 1. 1: Articles of Equal Protection for Inter-Ethnic Marriage 
from National Marriage Laws   
Year Articles of Protection for Inter-Ethnic Marriage 
1950 Article 1 Abolish the feudal arranged marriage system. 
Article 3 Marriage must be based upon the complete willingness of 
both man and woman. Neither party may use compulsion on the other 
party and no third party may interfere. 
Article 27 The people's congresses in national autonomous areas shall 
have the right to formulate certain adaptations in light of the specific 




Article 2 A marriage system based on the free choice of partners, on 
monogamy and on equality between man and woman shall be applied. 
Article 5 Marriage must be based on the complete willingness of both 
man and woman. Neither party may use compulsion on the other party 
and no third party may interfere. 
Article 50 The people's congresses in national autonomous areas shall 
have the right to formulate certain adaptations in light of the specific 
conditions of the local nationalities in regard to marriage and family. 
Provisions of adaptations formulated by autonomous prefectures and 
autonomous counties must be submitted to the standing committee of 
the People's Congress of the relevant province or autonomous region 
or municipality directly under the Central Government for approval. 
Provisions of adaptations formulated by autonomous regions must be 
submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's 














Appendix Table 1. 2: Provincial- and County- Level Adaptations of the National Marriage Law in Ethnic Minority Residential Areas 
 Year 
Minimum Marriage 
Age [1] Religion [2] 
Equal Protection of 
Interethnic Marriage 
[3] Note 
Province Level:       
Xin Jing Uyghur  
1981, 
1983,1988,1990 Yes Yes   
Xi Zang Tibetan  1982, 2004 Yes Yes  
Respect the ethnic marriage traditions 
without prejudice the marriage freedom. 
Ning Xia Hui  1981 Yes  Yes  
Nei Mongol  1981, 1988, 2003 Yes    
      
County Level:       
Gui Zhou      
Qian Nan Buyi-Miao  1985, 1994 Yes  Yes  
Zi Yun Miao 1983-2003 Yes  Yes  
Song Tao Miao 1985-2002 Yes  Yes  
Zhen Ning Buyi-Miao  1985-2009 Yes  Yes  
Qing Hai      
Xunhua Salar 1981 Yes  Yes  
Hua Long, Hui 1981 Yes Yes Yes  
Huang Nan Tibetan 1982 Yes Yes Yes  
He Nan Mongolian 1982 Yes Yes Yes  
Hai Xi Mongolian-
Tibetan 1983 Yes    
Hai Bei Tibetan 1983 Yes  Yes  





Age [1] Religion [2] 
Equal Protection of 
Interethnic Marriage 
[3] Note 
Min He Hui 1986 Yes    
Da Tong Hui 1987 Yes Yes Yes  
Yu Shu Tibetan 1987 Yes Yes Yes 
Respect the ethnic marriage traditions 
without prejudice the national marriage 
law. 
Guo Luo Tibetan 1987 Yes Yes Yes  
Si Chuan      
A Ba Tibetan-Qiang 1984, 1988 Yes    
E Bian Yi 1989 Yes   
Protection of interethnic marriage with 
Yi 
Ma Bian Yi 1992 Yes  Yes  
Gan Su      
Aksay Kazakh 1993 Yes    
Xin Jiang      
Ili Kazakh 1987，2005 Yes Yes Yes  
Yun Nan      
Meng Lian 1981 Yes    
Cang Yuan Wa 1981 Yes    
Ning Lang Yi 1981 Yes    
Xi Meng Yi 1982 Yes    
Geng Ma Dai-Wa 1982 Yes    
Notes:1. Approved minimum legal marriage age: Male 20, Female 18 in ethnic autonomous regions. 
 2. Mention of religion cannot interfere with marriage.  
 3. The full articles in the regulations are written as “both men and women have marriage freedom” and “interethnic marriage is equally protected, and no one or 
a third party may interfere.”  
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Appendix Table 1. 3: Full Regression of Impact of Han-Minzu Intermarriage on Income in Western China  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Female   Male 
 
OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage   OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
Han-Minzu Intermarriage 0.1317*** . 0.1598  0.1254*** . -0.0979 
 (0.0507) (.) (0.3640)  (0.0375) (.) (0.3751) 
Minzu Status -0.1153*** 0.0785*** -0.1118**  -0.1589*** 0.0235** -0.1617*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0141) (0.0511)  (0.0278) (0.0114) (0.0321) 
Living in Rural -1.2867*** -0.1318*** -1.2835***  -1.2502*** -0.1193*** -1.2654*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0139) (0.0616)  (0.0380) (0.0112) (0.0521) 
Muslim -0.1080 -0.0964*** -0.1306*  -0.1060** -0.0459*** -0.1075** 
 (0.0734) (0.0235) (0.0789)  (0.0453) (0.0175) (0.0508) 
Age 0.0301* 0.0002 0.0210  0.0292** 0.0090** 0.0295*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0047) (0.0135)  (0.0116) (0.0038) (0.0108) 
Age squared -0.0004* -0.0000 -0.0003*  -0.0004*** -0.0001** -0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
CCP membership 0.2702*** 0.0248 0.2634***  0.1782*** 0.0136 0.1767*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0182) (0.0535)  (0.0349) (0.0116) (0.0318) 
College or higher degree 0.7687*** 0.0561** 0.7619***  0.3842*** 0.0762*** 0.4078*** 
 
(0.0573) (0.0226) (0.0687)  (0.0433) (0.0174) (0.0541) 
Some college but not a four-year degree 0.6001*** 0.0531*** 0.6080***  0.3141*** 0.0343** 0.3259*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0187) (0.0580)  (0.0433) (0.0155) (0.0438) 
Self employed 0.2922*** 0.0481*** 0.2951***  0.3495*** -0.0028 0.3596*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0180) (0.0549)  (0.0448) (0.0135) (0.0362) 
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 Female   Male 
 OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage   OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
Migrant worker 0.9379*** 0.0116 0.9278***  0.5650*** 0.0028 0.5564*** 
 (0.0668) (0.0211) (0.0613)  (0.0450) (0.0142) (0.0379) 
Ever had a local equal protection clause of Han-Ethnic Minzu 
 -0.0412**    -0.0484**  
  (0.0187)    (0.0224)  
Support Han-Minzu Intermarriage 
 0.0919***    0.0666***  
  (0.0124)    (0.0099)  
Constant 8.9271*** 0.0907 9.2014***  9.5430*** -0.0548 9.7416*** 
 (0.3554) (0.0959) (0.2768)  (0.2432) (0.0824) (0.2159) 
Province Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,114 4,045 4,045  5,956 5,855 5,855 
R2-adjusted 0.378 0.133 0.378  0.395 0.118 0.388 
Chi-squared   2,476    3,773 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Source: CHES 2011. 








Appendix Table 1. 4: Full Regression of Impact of Han-Minzu Intermarriage on Income in Western China for Ethnic-Minzu  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Ethnic-Minzu Female   Ethnic-Minzu Male 
 
OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage   OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
Han-Minzu Intermarriage 0.0677 . 0.5588  0.2663*** . 0.1852 
 (0.0792) (.) (0.8654)  (0.0482) (.) (0.4005) 
Living in Rural -1.3784*** -0.2126*** -1.2775***  -1.2457*** -0.1610*** -1.2578*** 
 (0.0851) (0.0204) (0.1912)  (0.0546) (0.0143) (0.0798) 
Muslim -0.0036 -0.1589*** 0.0750  -0.0782 -0.0951*** -0.0626 
 (0.1071) (0.0251) (0.1581)  (0.0624) (0.0161) (0.0650) 
Age -0.0163 0.0040 -0.0246  0.0190 -0.0034 0.0168 
 (0.0233) (0.0065) (0.0201)  (0.0147) (0.0044) (0.0133) 
Age squared 0.0003 -0.0000 0.0003  -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
CCP membership 0.3394*** 0.0056 0.3153***  0.2018*** 0.0305** 0.2066*** 
 (0.0664) (0.0258) (0.0789)  (0.0432) (0.0146) (0.0455) 
College or higher degree 0.8006*** -0.0085 0.8125***  0.4226*** 0.0851*** 0.4338*** 
 
(0.0861) (0.0290) (0.0889)  (0.0597) (0.0197) (0.0664) 
Some college but not a four-year degree 0.7007*** -0.0381 0.7579***  0.4170*** -0.0374* 0.4169*** 
 (0.0948) (0.0259) (0.0857)  (0.0575) (0.0192) (0.0599) 
Self employed 0.2714** 0.1362*** 0.2114  0.2953*** 0.0265 0.2970*** 
 (0.1070) (0.0262) (0.1379)  (0.0711) (0.0175) (0.0531) 
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 Ethnic-Minzu Female   Ethnic-Minzu Male 
 OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage  OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
Migrant worker 0.8860*** -0.0093 0.8783***  0.5603*** 0.0328** 0.5580*** 
 (0.0746) (0.0283) (0.0871)  (0.0496) (0.0166) (0.0513) 
Ever had a local equal protection clause of Han-Ethnic Minzu  -0.0469    -0.1985***  
  (0.0448)    (0.0273)  
Support Han-Minzu Intermarriage 
 0.0591***    0.0227*  
  (0.0177)    (0.0127)  
Constant 9.5728*** 0.1872 9.6198***  9.4704*** 0.4061*** 9.7663*** 
 (0.4610) (0.1345) (0.4487)  (0.2984) (0.0940) (0.2885) 
Province Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,099 2,072 2,072  3,266 3,214 3,214 
R2-adjusted 0.390 0.196 0.378  0.407 0.178 0.403 
Chi-squared   1340     2171 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Source: CHES 2011. 







Appendix Table 1. 5: Full Regression of Impact of Han-Minzu Intermarriage on Income in Westwen China for Han 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Han-Female   Han-Male 
 
OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage   OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
Han-Minzu Intermarriage 0.1336** . -0.0164  0.0766 . -0.1007 
 (0.0672) (.) (0.4640)  (0.0495) (.) (0.4331) 
Living in Rural -1.2671*** -0.1033*** -1.2816***  -1.2483*** -0.0995*** -1.2454*** 
 (0.0672) (0.0190) (0.0721)  (0.0489) (0.0167) (0.0578) 
Muslim -0.2574 0.3236** -0.2070  -0.3489* 0.0072 -0.2574 
 (0.2557) (0.1528) (0.4690)  (0.1821) (0.1261) (0.2557) 
Age 0.0453** -0.0012 0.0353*  0.0349** 0.0133** 0.0373** 
 (0.0225) (0.0066) (0.0192)  (0.0164) (0.0061) (0.0165) 
Age squared -0.0006** 0.0000 -0.0005**  -0.0005*** -0.0002** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
CCP membership 0.2407*** 0.0300 0.2446***  0.1572*** 0.0008 0.1563*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0252) (0.0744)  (0.0468) (0.0175) (0.0453) 
College or higher degree 0.7509*** 0.0877*** 0.7534***  0.3560*** 0.0693** 0.3726*** 
 
(0.0761) (0.0329) (0.1042)  (0.0597) (0.0278) (0.0775) 
Some college but not a four-year degree 0.5540*** 0.0847*** 0.5614***  0.2687*** 0.0720*** 0.2861*** 
 (0.0659) (0.0261) (0.0870)  (0.0580) (0.0236) (0.0698) 
Self employed 0.3101*** 0.0241 0.3203***  0.3677*** -0.0060 0.3734*** 
 (0.0731) (0.0247) (0.0728)  6.5891 (0.0201) (0.0519) 
Migrant worker 0.9797*** 0.0433 0.9843***  (0.0639) -0.0058 0.5605*** 
 (0.0926) (0.0301) (0.0904)  9.1584 (0.0222) (0.0571) 
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 Han-Female   Han-Male 
 OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage  OLS IV First Stage IV Second Stage 
Ever had a local equal protection clause of Han-Ethnic Minzu 
 -0.0451*    0.1013**  
  (0.0251)    (0.0395)  
Support Han-Minzu Intermarriage 
 0.0997***    0.0795***  
  (0.0171)    (0.0148)  
Constant 8.6978*** 0.1054 8.9455***  9.4738*** -0.3411** 9.6636*** 
 (0.4690) (0.1363) (0.3954)  (0.3466) (0.1337) (0.3418) 
Province Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,015 1,973 1,973  2,690 2,641 2,641 
R2-adjusted 0.381 0.154 0.378  0.393 0.127 0.387 
Chi-squared   1227    1703 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Source: CHES 2011. 




Appendix Figure 2.1: Revised D-M Ratio by Provinces, Same Upper Age Bound 
for Males and Females 
 
Source: IPUMS-I 1% China Census, 1982-2000. 









Appendix Figure 3.1A: Percentage of Chinese Men Ever Married, by Age and 
Census  
 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
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Appendix Figure 3.1.B: Percentage of Chinese Women Ever Married, by Age 
and Census  
 
 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
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Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
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Appendix Figure 3.2.B: Percentage of Chinese Women Ever Married, by Age 
and Birth Cohort 
 
 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
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Appendix Table 3.1: Race of Spouse for Intermarried Chinses Females Age 20 
and over, 1880-1940 Censuses 
 
 1880 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 
White Male 77.78% 85.19% 55.56% 66.67% 100.00% 85.71% 
Black Male 11.11% / / / / 8.93% 
Mulatto 11.11% / / 2.30% / / 
Other Asians / 14.81% 44.44% 20.00% / 5.36% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 



























Appendix Table 3.2: Event History Analysis of Impact of Chinese Anti-
Miscegenation Laws 
 
  (1) (2) 
Census before passage of Asian/Chines anti-miscegenation law     
-3 0.0139 0.0167 
 (0.0255) (0.0254) 
-2 -0.0034 -0.0044 
 (0.0120) (0.0121) 
-1 -0.0015 -0.0021 
 (0.0109) (0.0109) 
   
P-value test of joint significance 0.7998 0.7028 
   
 Law passage -0.0085 -0.0087 
 (0.0113) (0.0111) 
   
Census after passage of Asian/Chines anti-miscegenation law   
1 -0.0024 -0.0026 
 (0.0084) (0.0078) 
2 -0.0030 -0.0031 
 (0.0072) (0.0067) 
3 -0.0052 -0.0043 
 (0.0070) (0.0066) 
4 -0.0088 -0.0076 
 (0.0062) (0.0059) 
5 -0.0003 0.0006 
 (0.0043) (0.0040) 
   
P-value test of joint significance - years 0-5  0.1232 0.4498 
   
P-value test of joint significance - years 1-5  0.0778 0.3453 
   
Chinatown in City  -0.0022** 
  (0.0009) 
US Born  0.0133*** 
  (0.0042) 
Illiteracy  -0.0048** 
  (0.0023) 
Skewed sex ratio (=1 if sex ratio>=10)  0.0029 
  (0.0019) 
Constant 0.0574*** 0.0564*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0139) 
   
Observations 241,463 239,074 
Source: IPUMS-USA Complete Count for 1880 –1940. 
Notes: Appendix Table 3.2 includes all the intermarried Chinese men aged 20 and 
over. 
Standard errors clustered on state in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
